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Purpose Statement
This publication is by and largely for the academic communities ofthe twenty-eight colleges and universities ofthe Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America. It is published by the Division for Higher Education and Schools ofthe ELCA. The publication
.presently has its home at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio which has generously offered leadership, physical and :financial
support as an institutional sponsor for the inauguration ofthe publication.
What is the purpose of such a publication?
The ELCA has frequently sponsored conferences for faculty and administrators which have addressed the church
college/university partnership. Recently the ELCA has sponsored an annual Vocation ofthe Lutheran College conference. The
primary purpose of INTERSECTIONS is to enhance and continue such dialogue. It will do so by:
* Lifting up the vocation of Lutheran colleges and universities
* Encouraging thoughtful dialogue about the partnership ofcolleges and universities with the church
* Offering a forum for concerns and interests offaculty at the intersection offaith, learning and teaching
* Raising for debate issues about institutional missions, goals, objectives and learning priorities
* Encouraging critical and productive discussion on our campuses ofissues focal to the life ofthe church
* Serving as a bulletin board for communications among institutions and faculties
* Publishing papers presented at conferences sponsored by the ELCA and its institutions
* Raising the level ofawareness among faculty about the Lutheran heritage and connectedness oftheir institutions,
realizing a sense ofbeing part ofa larger family with common interests and concerns.
From the Editor
Jim Unglaube, who has served the ELCA's Division for Higher Education and Schools (and before that in the same office of
· the ALC) has made a career move. Beginning the first ofJanuary he has begun his duties at Carthage College, his alma mater.
Jim has been the coordinator ofthe three previous Vocation ofa Lutheran College Conferences, and has served as the Publisher
ofINTERSECTIONS. Both ofthese things he has worked diligently at, planning, enabling, and finding funding for them as they
have developed. In both projects he has obviously been concerned to initiate and continue a significant dialogue about the
meaning and possibilities of Lutheran higher education in the ELCA. He has done all this in his own quiet, modest, and efficient
way. We all, whether we are directly aware ofour connection to him or not, owe him a debt of gratitude. Let me personally say
that it has been a pleasure to work with him and learn from him. Thank you Jim! Our best wishes to you on your new endeavors.
In previous issues ofINTERSECTIONS I have used my editorial space to recommend some reading to you. I'm doing the same
again. The book is Keeping Faith: Embracing the Tensions in Christian Higher Education, edited by Ronald A. Wells and
published by Eerdmans. I recommend this book not only because ofthe interesting essays it contains but because ofthe kind of
model it represents. It is a series ofessays written and collected on the occasion ofthe installation of Gaylen Byker as the new
president ofCalvin College. What a great thing for a college to do; to collect the thoughts of significant people who have
connection with the institution to reflect about the meaning ofits mission and education there. We should do something like this
in our ELCA institutions.
This issue ofINTERSECTIONS includes several provocative pieces. Richard Hughes has revised and expanded the text of his
address to last summer's Vocation ofa Lutheran College Conference for inclusion here. We include some selections from a
serious, yet ironic treatment of theological topics in dictionary form written by Carl Skrade and Spencer Porter. Gregory Clark
has written a challenging essay about themes of peace and violence embedded in the rhetoric that shapes education. His essay is
included here with a question-raising response by Karla Bohmbach.
This issue ofINTERSECTIONS also initiates some new features which we hope will continue: What I Have Learned - an
essay by one ofour senior or emeritus faculty reflecting on their long experience as scholars and teachers in our institutions,
initiated by Richard Ylvisaker; Reviews, - where recent books, the arts, films, and other media presentations can be reviewed by
our readers, initiated with a review by Karla Bohmbach; Bulletin Board - where news ofprograms that may be ofinterest to
faculty/administration at all our institutions may be listed. Please feel free to submit material or suggestions for all three of these
features as well as response to what you read here.
Tom Christenson
January 1998
Capital University

THE VOCATION OF A LUfflERAN COLLEGE:
SOME TRANSITIONAL THOUGHTS
I come to you with some final reflections on 30 years in Lutheran higher education. I do this even as I begin a new chapter in my own
journey at Carthage College, my own Alma Mater. Leaving the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America's Division for Higher
Education and Schools has not been easy. The Vocation of a Lutheran College project is a good example of what made that a difficult
decision. We have been called as colleges and universities of the church to be places where mind, body and spirit are nurtured; to be
places of both high quality and of excellence in all that we do. We have been called to be places which help students come to an
understanding of their own vocation and then to take ownership of it. The results of our efforts are best told through the stories of
our students, where and how they live out their own vocation as global citizens in service to the church and to the larger society. You
all know those stories and we all need to keep telling them.
I look back now on my own good fortune. I began to explore my own vocation as a student at Carthage College. I began to live it out
as a faculty member in chemistry at Lenoir-Rhyne College. I thought I would spend my life there doing that. I didn't. I took a turn
into academic administration, also at Lenoir-Rhyne. And then, an opportunity came along to be a part of nurturing the church's
mission in higher education, an opportunity which lasted twenty years. I made an apprehensive entry into this role, grew through the
support and encouragement of countless people, and, now as I look back,· had an almost unbelievable experience. I will not forget
the importance of my colleague, Richard Solberg, in the early days of that work. My life became intertwined with the lives of 29
colleges and universities and of thousands of people.
I had the good fortune of watching these institutions thrive and grow in strength and stature. I watched as we made our way through
the period of population decline of traditional college-age students. We came through that period, by and large, remarkable well. We
grew slowly but steadily in enrollment through that period. We were fortunate to enter the new period of financial challenge in our
lives, in the midst of which we now live, in rather good shape. Our endowments, while still not large enough, have grown from $70
million to $1 billion in 25 years. Our students benefit from $500 million a year in financial aid. They also benefit from faculties as
strong as they have ever been. It has not all been easy. I was directly involved in the decisions leading to the closing of Upsalsa
College in 1995. That was a sad day. While the closing was, perhaps, inevitable, Upsala was serving a very diverse student body. It
was living out an important vocation while struggling for its life. I along with my colleague Naomi Linnell, had the wonderful
opportunity to live out the Higher Education and Namibia program. You on the campuses made the dream Naomi and I had come
true. As a group we played, in fact we continue to play an important role in the development of the new nation of Namibia, now
almost eight years old. This program too was a measure of our vocation as institutions in the Lutheran tradition.
And then, I was gifted to travel all over the world. I still pinch myself to be sure it's true the places I've been on behalf of our work
together. I never expected this to be a part of my work. Now my challenge is to touch the two remaining continents I have not visited;
Australia and Antarctica. The latter, at least, will be hard to justify on behalf of Lutheran higher education or Carthage College.
Perhaps an alumni tour. Perhaps the annual Vocation of a Lutheran College conference. At least air conditioning would not be a
problem.
I look back as well on our Vocation of a Lutheran College project. It has thrived and it has meant a great deal to me personally. I
continue to thank Paul Dovre, President of Concordia College, for coming to us with the idea. It has benefited now from more than
$200,000 in grant support. It must continue. It was put in place to help all of us come to a better understanding of what it means to
be an institution of higher education in the Lutheran tradition. We live in a time of challenges to that tradition, from within the
church and from the larger society. We hope that this project can help maintain and develop the strength of the partnership between
church and college in the Lutheran tradition. I hope I can get to the conferences in the future.
The colleges and universities of the Lutheran church are occasionally referred to as jewels. I agree with that characterization but I
have another. I like to think of them as beautiful flowers, let's say roses. All of the flowers on a bush are the same color; the Lutheran
tradition in higher education. At the same time each blossom is a little different from the next; the colleges and universities while
all being a part of that tradition have their own histories and cultures. They live out their vocation in their own way. And, the rose
bush will only thrive if it is cared for by the gardener. The same with the partnership between church and college. The partnership
will only survive and thrive if it is nurtured. Let us never forget to water the flower, to trim them when they need it, to treasure their
fragrance, and to share all that they are with each other.
Thanks for the ride!
James M. Unglaube
Associate Vice President for Advancement and Senior Planned Giving Officer
Carthage College
Kenosha, Wisconsin

OUR PLACE IN CHURCH-RELATED HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
Richard T. Hughes
What special niche do Lutheran colleges and universities
occupy in the world of church-related higher education in the
United States? I want to address this question with reference
to the primary task of higher education, namely, our
obligation to enhance the life of the mind. When we ask,
then, about the special niche Lutheran colleges and
universities occupy in the world of church-related higher
education, we are really asking, "What unique theological
resources do Lutherans bring to the task of higher education,
and how can those resources sustain the life of the mind?"
Before we begin, we must be clear on what we mean by the
phrase, "the life of the mind." Surely, the life of the mind
has little to do with rote memorization or the manipulation
of data. Instead, it has everything to do with three
dimensions of human thought. First, the life of the mind
commits us to a rigorous and disciplined search for truth.
Second, in the context of that search, the life of the mind
entails genuine conversation as we seriously engage a
variety of perspectives and worldviews in our radically
pluralistic world. And third, the life of the mind involves
critical thinking as we seek to discriminate between those
worldviews and perspectives. When we ask, therefore, how
the Lutheran heritage can sustain the life of the mind, we are
asking how the Lutheran heritage can sustain the twin tasks
of conversation and critical analysis in the context of the
search for truth.
My Introduction to the Lutheran Faith
Before getting into the substance of my remarks, I want to
make a few autobiographical observations. In the first
place, I am not Lutheran in a formal sense, but I am
profoundly Lutheran in a spiritual sense.
I grew up in a religious heritage that, at least in the days of
my youth, was fraught with legalism and biblicism. As a
result, I had little or no sense of biblical themes like
"justification by grace through faith" until I was perhaps 20
years old. A single incident will illustrate this point.
Richard T. Hughes is Distinguished Professor of Religion at
Pepperdine Univ., and co-editor (along with William B.
Adrian) of Models for Christian Higher Education:
Strategies for Success in The Twentieth Century.

When I was in the fifth grade, growing up in San Angelo,
Texas, I always walked to school and had to cross a very
busy street before I reached my final destination. I vividly
recall reminding myself on many occasions that if per chance
I were struck by a car and killed on the way to school, I
must remember to ask God for forgiveness for all the sins I
had committed since my most recent prayers. Ifl managed
to get that prayer in before I expired, I had a chance at going
to heaven. If not, I would be doomed to eternal damnation.
You might think this a morbid thought for a ten-year old kid,
but that's the way it was in my world in those years.
I don't recall hearing the gospel of God's grace until I was
a sophomore in a church-related college. In a course on the
book of Romans, the professor came to Romans 8: l: "For
there is therefore now no condemnation to those who are in
Christ Jesus." He explained to us that this text meant
precisely what it said-that those of us who were in Christ
Jesus had been liberated by the grace of God from the
obligation to achieve perfection. I was flabbergasted, but
also immensely relieved.
Some four years later, I encountered again the message of
God's grace in an extraordinarily powerful way. Once
again, the encounter occurred in a university classroom.
This time, however, the setting was not a church college but
a state university-the University of Iowa where I was
working on my doctorate in the field of religion. And the
class was not on Romans, but on Martin Luther. The
Professor was George Porell. I shall never forget the day
when Porell explained Luther's concept of simul ;ustus et
peccator (simultaneously justified and a sinner) - a far cry
from my earlier childhood understanding that I would have
to utter a prayer of contrition before I could possibly be
accepted by Almighty God. The truth is, I found Luther
incredibly liberating, so much so that Luther's theology of
justification by grace through faith has formed the bedrock
of my spiritual orientation from that day to this.
And so I speak in this essay not as a Lutheran in a formal,
confessional sense, but as a Lutheran in terms of my own
spiritual commitments, at least in certain fundamental
respects. I also speak as a university professor deeply
concerned for the integrity of the academic enterprise. This
means that I have asked myself countless times over the past
twenty-five years, "How can the Lutheran worldview sustain
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the life of the mind?" I hope in this paper to share some
perspectives on that question.
Some Comparisons
We will grasp those perspectives far better if we begin by
comparing the Lutheran heritage with three other Christian
traditions. I want to ask first about the theological resources
the Reformed tradition brings to the task of higher education,
and how that tradition is equipped to sustain the life of the
mind. I want to begin with the Reformed model since that
model is so widely known and embraced in many Protestant
circles of church-related higher education. Then, I want to
ask the very same questions regarding Mennonites, on the
one hand, and Roman Catholics, on the other. Once we ask
and answer these questions, we will be in a good position to
ask about the special niche Lutheran colleges and
universities occupy in the world of church-related higher
education in the United States.
A Reformed Model
If we ask how the Reformed tradition can sustain the life of
the mind, the answer has everything to do with the original
vision of John Calvin. Simply put, Calvin sought to
transform Geneva, Switzerland into a model kingdom of
God. To achieve this goal, he sought to place every facet of
Genevan life-its religion, its politics, its music and its
art-squarely under the sovereignty of God. Ever since those
early days, this same vision has motivated Calvinists to
bring all human life and culture under the sovereign sway of
God's control. Abraham Kuyper, the Dutch statesman and
philosopher, expressed this vision well: "There is not a
square inch on the whole plain of human existence over
which Christ, who is Lord over all, does not proclaim: 'This
is Mine1"' 1
Clearly, the passion to transform human culture into the
Kingdom of God is the driving genius of the Reformed
tradition, and it is precisely this vision that sustains the life
of the mind in many Reformed institutions of higher
learning. Reformed educators seek to place the entire
curriculum-and every course within the curriculum-under the
sovereignty of God. According to this vision, all learning
should be Christian in both purpose and orientation. For this
reason, Reformed educators employ three fundamental
concepts that underscore these objectives.
The first and most important of those concepts is a notion
popularized by Abraham Kuyper, the notion of a Christian
worldview. As Albert Wolters points out, Kuyper argued

that "Calvinism was not just a theology or a system of
ecclesiastical polity but a complete worldview with
implications for all of life, implications which must be
worked out and applied in such areas as politics, art, and
scholarship." With such a worldview, Kuyper believed,
Christianity could provide broad cultural leadership in the
nineteenth century and compete head to head with other
perspectives like socialism or Darwinism or positivism.2
Central to. the notion of a Christian worldview stands the
second conviction, the notion that all truth is God's truth.
By this phrase, Reformed educators mean to say that God is
the author not only of our faith, but also of every facet of the
world in which we live. If this is true, then there can be no
discrepancy between Christian convictions and authentic
knowledge regarding other aspects of human life. It is
therefore possible to understand every facet of the natural
sciences, of the social sciences, and of religion and the
humanities in the light of Christian faith without running the
risk of intellectual dishonesty.
It is precisely this conviction that breathes life into the third
concept employed by Reformed educators: the integration
offaith and learning. Because all truth is God's truth, all
learning should be integrated into a coherent understanding
ofreality, informed by explicitly Christian convictions. No
one has expressed the theological rationale for this
perspective better than Arthur Holmes in his classic book,
The Idea of a Christian College. There Holmes argues:
When the apostle writes that in Christ "are hid all the
treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Col. 2:3), he refers
...to [the fact that] Jesus Christ is... Creator and Lord
of every created thing. All our knowledge of anything
comes into focus around that fact. We see nature. persons,
society, and the arts and sciences in proper relationship to
their divine Creator and Lord. . . . The truth is a coherent
whole by virtue of the common focus that ties it all into
one. 3
It is incumbent, therefore, upon Reformed educators to
integrate explicitly Christian convictions into every branch
of learning and, more than that, to discover those common,
Christocentric threads that transform all fields of learning
into one coherent whole.
Finally, this triad of ideas - a Christian worldview, all truth
is God's truth, and the integration offaith and learning this triad of ideas sustains another notion that is critical to at
least one version of the Reformed understanding of reality:
the notion of secularization. The truth is, one finds in the
Reformed tradition two perspectives on this theme. First,
Calvin himself argued that "the Spirit of God [is] the sole
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fountain of truth," whether one finds that truth in the secular
sphere or in divine revelation.4 At the same time, following
another impulse in Calvin, many contemporary Reformed
thinkers view the secular as a hindrance to the Christian
presence in the world and therefore seek to overcome it by
transforming it into the Kingdom of God. 5
From this latter perspective, secularization occurs when
there is even one dimension of human life that escapes the
sovereignty of God, or when we fail to bring all of reality
under the umbrella of a distinctly Christian worldview.
Because the possibility of secularization is so real in this
context, the notion of a slippery slope is a metaphor that
many in this tradition take very seriously. This means that
if one hopes to avoid the slippery slope toward
secularization, the integration of faith and learning around a
distinctly Christian worldview. becomes absolutely
imperative.
This consideration will become important when we compare
the Reformed tradition with Lutheranism, on the one hand,
and Catholicism, on the other. For if some in the Reformed
tradition argue that the slippery slope to secularization is a
real and present danger, both the Lutheran and Catholic
traditions acknowledge the secular as a legitimate vehicle of
the grace of God.
Now we must finally ask, "How can the Reformed tradition
sustain the life of the mind?" Clearly, it does so by
integrating faith and learning around a distinctly Christian
worldview. One can identify at least two great strengths of
this perspective, whether one subscribes to the Reformed
worldview or not. In the first place, it overcomes
fragmentation with its wholistic approach to learning. And
in the second place, it provides students with a clearly
defined standpoint from which they can discriminate between
competing perspectives and worldviews. And if one cares
about relating faith to learning at all, one is likely to find the
Reformed emphasis on the sovereignty of God over the entire
learning process extraordinarily compelling.
But to what extent does the Reformed perspective encourage
academic freedom and genuine interaction with pluralism
and diversity? There are two answers to that question.
First, if a given scholar embraces the Reformed worldview,
and is willing to understand all reality from the standpoint of
that perspective, she or he will experience substantial
academic freedom. Arthur Holmes, among others, has made
this point abundantly clear.
Academic freedom is valuable only when there is a prior
commitment to the truth. And commitment to the truth is

fully worthwhile only when that truth exists in One who
transcends both the relativity of human perspectives and
the fears ofhuman concern. 6
On the other hand, while the Reformed perspective allows
the scholar substantial freedom to search for penultimate
truths within the context of an all-embracing Christian
worldview, the Reformed perspective is always susceptible
to the twin risks of triumphalism and distortion. A
hyp othetical case in point might be a class in world religions.
How, for example, would one study Buddhism from the
standpoint of a Christian worldview without either distorting
Buddhism into something it is not or debunking Buddhism in
favor of a triumphalist Christian perspective?
And yet, the Reformed tradition contains at its core a
powerful sentiment that can undermine triumphalism. That
sentiment is simply the historic Reformed insistence on the
finitude of humankind and of all human thinking and
constructions. Arthur Holmes points squarely to that
conviction when he writes, "Truth is not yet fully known;
every academic discipline is subject to change, correction,
and expansion-even theology." Holmes further notes that
even worldview construction must take on tentative
dimensions. A Christian worldview, he argues, is merely
"exploratory, not a closed system worked out once and for
all but an endless undertaking. . . . It remains open-ended
because the task is so vast that to complete it would require
the omniscience of God."7
And yet, the notion that God has called upon His saints to
renovate the world is such an overpowering theme in the
Reformed tradition that the profoundly Calvinist theme of
human finitude and brokenness sometimes gets lost in the
shuffle.
A Mennonite Model
When we tum from the Reformed to the
Anabaptist/Mennonite tradition, we quickly discover that we
have entered into a frame of reference radically different
from the Reformed perspective. The first thing we notice is
that the starting point for Mennonites has more to do with
wholistic living than with cognition, more to do with ethics
than with intellect. One faculty member at Goshen College
summarized very nicely the difference between the Reformed
and Mennonite models when she observed that if the
Reformed model is fundamentally cerebral and transforms
living by thinking, the Mennonite model transforms thinking
by living.
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More precisely, Mennonites begin their task by seeking to
implement a vision of discipleship that takes its cue from the
radical teachings of Jesus. They take seriously Jesus' words
when he counseled his followers to abandon self in the
interest of others, or when he charged his disciples to
practice humility, simplicity, and non-violence. Their's is a
radical vision, to be sure, and one that stands almost entirely
out of synch with the values of the larger culture.
One who is unaccustomed to the Mennonite frame of
reference might well ask what this perspective has to do with
the life of the mind. How can unconventional virtues like
these possibly sustain the values we associate with the
academy? Put another way, how does one move from
Christocentric living to critical and pluralistic thinking?
We can answer that question in three ways. First, we must
recall that sixteenth-century Anabaptism originated in the
very womb of dissent. In a world that prized lockstep
uniformity, Anabaptists dared to question the status quo. It
matters little that their dissent began with lifestyle
commitments, not with high-level theoretical formulations.
Regardless of their starting point, sixteenth-century
Anabaptists proved time and again their commitment to
independent thinking.
If a willingness to question
conventional wisdom stands at the heart of the academic
enterprise, then surely the Anabaptist heritage offers
important resources for sustaining the life of the mind.
Second, Mennonites routinely counsel one another to
abandon self in the interest of others and to abandon narrow
nationalism in the interest of world citizenship. For this
reason, service to other human beings, especially to the poor,
the marginalized, and the oppressed throughout the world,
stands at the heart of the Mennonite witness. If we ask how
a global service commitment like this can sustain the life of
the mind, the answer is not hard to find. It is difficult to
abandon self for the sake of others in any meaningful sense
unless one is prepared to take seriously those "others," their
cultural contexts, and their points of view. This means that
Mennonite colleges, precisely because of their service
orientation, are prepared to take seriously one of the cardinal
virtues of the modern academy: the emphasis on pluralism
and diversity.
If one wishes to see how this commitment might play itself
out in an academic context, one need only consider the
international studies program at Goshen College where
eighty percent of all students spend one entire semester in a
third world culture where they serve, on the one hand, and
seek to learn that country's history, cultural traditions, and

language, on the other.
Finally, because of its historic emphasis on humility, the
Mennonite tradition prepares its scholars to embrace one of
the cardinal virtues of the academic guild: the willingness to
admit that my understandings may be fragmentary and
incomplete and that, indeed, I could be wrong.
For all these reasons, the Mennonite commitment to a life of
radical discipleship can contribute in substantial ways to a
vigorous life of the mind. Yet, we must also acknowledge
that while the Mennonite commitment to stand with a radical
Jesus is surely one of their greatest strengths, it can also be
a serious liability in the arena of higher education.
Ironically, the very commitment that has often inspired
humility, dissent, and respect for cultural diversity can also
inspire narrowness and sectarian exclusivity. This can
happen in several ways, when Mennonites, for example,
allow the radical teachings of Jesus to become little more
than the substance of ethnic folkways, or when Mennonites
take seriously the ethical mandates of Jesus without
embracing with equal seriousness the grace of God whereby
He forgives us in spite of our failings and shortcomings.
A Roman Catholic Model

When we ask about a Roman Catholic model for higher
education, the first thing we notice is the diversity that
characterizes Catholic institutions of higher learning. After
all, Catholic colleges and universities were established not
by the church per se but by a variety of religious orders that
bring to the task of higher education a diversity of emphases.
Nonetheless, we find in all Catholic colleges and universities
certain uniquely Catholic dimensions that sustain the life of
the mind.
The first of these dimensions is the sacramental principle
which points to the fact that the natural world and even
elements of human culture can serve as vehicles by which the
grace of God is mediated to human beings. This conviction
allows Catholic educators to take the world seriously on its
own terms and to interact with the world as it is.
If some Reformed educators argue that the world and the
contents of human culture are fundamentally secular if not
brought under the sovereign sway of the Lord Jesus Christ,
many Catholic educators, affirming the sacramental
principle, take sharp issue with that contention. Alice
Gallin, former executive director of the Association for
Catholic Colleges and Universities, for example, has argued
that '"secular' is not simply nor always the opposite of
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'sacred,' for in a Christian sacramental view of reality, the
secular has a legitimate role and one that is congruent with
and not opposed to faith or religion. " 8

engaged with, and have an interest in, both edges of every
gulf must understand each, encompass each in its total
community and build a bridge of understanding and love. 11

This is why David O'Brien of the College of the Holy Cross
points to one of the documents of Vatican II, The Pastoral
Constitution on the Church and the Modern World, as a
virtual '"magna charta" for Catholic colleges and
universities. It functions in this way, O'Brien argued, since
it affirms "the study of the human sciences, respect for non
Catholic, secular culture, dialogue with those beyond the
church, and service to society," all in the context of the
Two other Catholic
sacramental principle. 9
educators-Emmanuel Renner and Hilary Thimmesh,
writing in Models for Christian Higher Education-argue
that "secularization could very well mean sacramentalization
to those who recognized the presence of God in the world." 10

This notion of the Catholic university as bridge, rooted in
the universality of the Catholic faith, can play itself out in
some very concrete ways, most notably in faculty hiring
policies. On the one hand, Notre Dame has sought to create
that bridge by hiring not only a diversity of faculty from a
variety of faith traditions and no tradition at all, but also by
insuring "'the continuing presence of a predominant number
of Catholic intellectuals"' on the faculty, as the university's
president mandated in 1993. 12 On the other hand, many
Catholic institutions, grounding themselves in that same
concern for universality, demonstrate little or no concern
with this issue. David O'Brien reports, for example, that "a
Jesuit dean [at Georgetown] told the faculty that, while
wisdom rooted in faith remained central at Georgetown, 'a
person's religion plays no part in hiring, tenure, promotion,
the awarding of grants or the securing of funds. In fact,
most of us don't know each other's religious beliefs.'" 13

In a word, the sacramental principle sustains the life of the
mind by placing a very great value both on the natural world
and on human culture, and by reminding us that these realms
are fully legitimate, whether transformed by the· rule of
Christ or not. For this reason, the notion of a slippery slope
to secularization scarcely makes sense in a Roman Catholic
context.
The second characteristic that allows the Catholic tradition
to sustain the life of the mind is the universality of the
Catholic faith. As a global church, Catholicism embraces
believers from every comer of the world, people who hold a
variety of political ideologies, who speak a myriad of
tongues, who represent virtually every nationality in the
world, and who reflect every social and economic class on
the planet today. Not only is Catholicism universal in this
very tangible sense; it is also intentionally universal from a
theological point of view.
The universality of the Catholic tradition should permit the
Catholic university to prize pluralism and diversity and to
find a legitimate place at the table for every conversation
partner. Many have argued this case, but no one has done
so more effectively than Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, President
Emeritus of the University of Notre Dame. "The Catholic
university," Hesburgh writes:
must be a bridge across all the chasms that separate
modern people from each other: the gaps between young
and old, men and women, rich and poor, black and white,
believer and unbeliever, potent and weak, east and west,
material and spiritual, scientist and humanist, developed
and less developed, and all the rest. To be such a
mediator, the Catholic university, as universal, must be

The final Catholic commitment I wish to consider is one
Monika Hellwig describes as the communitarian nature of
redemption. At its core, this notion holds that the church is
not simply the hierarchical magisterium; instead, the church
is comprised of all the people of God, scattered throughout
the world, who together form this community of faith. This
means that the life of the mind, if understood only in
cognitive terms, is less than adequate in a Catholic
university. Instead, as Hellwig notes, the life of the mind
must translate itself into
genuine bonds of friendship and mutual respect and
support [which] are envisaged as the core of the
educational enterprise, because not only book learning but
human formation for leadership and responsibility in all
walks oflife are sought through the community experience
ofhigher education. 14
Precisely because it takes "seriously the unity of the human
race," the communitarian dimension suggests that Catholic
colleges and universities should place scholarship and
teaching in the service ofjustice and peace for all the peoples
of the world. To a great extent, Catholic institutions-and
especially Jesuit institutions-have done just that. As David
O'Brien observes, "president after president [in the world of
Catholic higher education] has repeated the words of the
American bishops insisting that pursuit of justice and human
dignity is an essential work of a Catholic institution. " 15
It is clear that the Roman Catholic tradition is at home with
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human reason, with the natural world, with secular human
culture, with human history, with human beings who stand
both inside and outside of the Catholic faith, and with human
beings in every conceivable social circumstance. It is
precisely this dimension that renders the Catholic faith, at
least in theory, so compatible with the ideals of the modem
university.
At the same time, it is entirely possible for the Catholic
tradition to stand at odds with the life of the mind. This can
happen when dogma displaces inquiry, when orthodoxy
undermines the search for truth, or when Catholics
absolutize those dimensions of Catholic faith that might
otherwise have the potential to break through their own
particularity.
A Lutheran Model
Finally, we must ask, "What resources does the Lutheran
tradition offer for sustaining the life of the mind?"
The first resource is Luther's insistence on human finitude
and the sovereignty of God. To speak of human finitude is
to point not only to our frailties, our limitations, and our
estrangement from God, from other human beings, and from
ourselves; it also points to the depth and breadth of sin that
renders us incapable of knowing or doing the good. When
Luther argues for God's sovereignty, therefore, his point is
not that Christians should impose God's sovereignty on an
unbelieving world. That would be an impossible absurdity.
Rather, when Luther points to God's sovereignty, he always
points at the very same time to human finitude. · The
sovereignty of God, therefore, means that I am not God, that
my reason is inevitably impaired, and that my knowledge is
always fragmentary and incomplete.
In the context of higher education and the life of the mind,
this position means that every scholar must always confess
that he or she could be wrong. Apart from this confession,
there can be no serious life of the mind, for only when we
confess that we might be wrong can we engage in the kind of
conversation that takes seriously other voices. Further, it is
only when we confess that we might be wrong that we are
empowered to critically scrutinize our own theories, our own
judgments, and our own understandings. Put another way,
in the Lutheran tradition, doubt is always the partner of
faith. In his marvelous book, Exiles from Eden, Mark
Schwehn quotes James Gustafson to the effect that "we
believe what we question and question what we believe." 16
Or, as the father of the boy with the evil spirit confessed to
Jesus in Mark 9, "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief."

One who refuses to confess that he or she might be wrong
has forfeited the ability to engage in critical scholarship and
really has no legitimate place in the academy.
Because of the Lutheran insistence on human finitude,
Lutheran theology always has the capacity to break through
its own particularity. Authentic Lutherans can never
absolutize their own perspectives, even their theological
perspectives. They must always be reassessing and
rethinking, and they must always be in dialogue with
themselves and with others. This is the genius of the
Lutheran tradition, and this is the first reason why the
Lutheran worldview can sustain the life of the mind.
The second resource the Lutheran tradition offers for
sustaining the life of the mind is Luther's notion of paradox,
a theme that stands at the heart of Lutheran thought. As we
know, Luther gloried in the notion of paradox: the King of
the universe born in a manger, God Himself nailed to a
Roman cross, the Christian who is both free and servant at
one and the same time, or finally, the Christian who is
simultaneously justified and a sinner.
But of all these Lutheran paradoxes, there is none more
supportive of the life of the mind than Luther's notion of the
two kingdoms. In his view, the Christian lives in the world
and in the Kingdom of God - or, put another way, in nature
and in grace-and does so simultaneously. In fact, in
Luther's vision, God employs the finite dimensions of the
natural world as vehicles which convey his grace to human
beings. As Luther often affinned,finitum capax in.finiti or,
the finite is the bearer of the infinite. At this point, the
Lutheran tradition greatly resembles Catholic sacramental
understandings.
The authentic Lutheran vision, therefore, never calls for
Lutherans to transform the secular world into the Kingdom
of God as many in the Reformed tradition have advocated
over the years. Nor does it call for Lutherans to separate
from the world as the heirs of the Anabaptists sometimes
seek to do. Instead, the Christian must reside in two worlds
at one and the same time: the world of nature and the world
of grace. The Christian in Luther's view, therefore, is free
to take seriously both the secular world and the Kingdom of
God.
This notion carries great implications for the life of the mind,
especially if we think of the life of the mind as one which
fosters genuine conversation in which all the voices at the
table are taken seriously. Clearly, in the Lutheran context,
there is a "Christian worldview." But in the light of
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Luther's two kingdoms, there is no need to impose that
worldview on other voices. Nor is it important to "integrate
faith and learning" around that perspective. Rather, one
seeks to bring the secular world and a Christian perspective
into conversation with one another. Luther's notion of the
two kingdoms is therefore fully capable of sustaining a
commitment to the Christian faith and a serious engagement
with the secular world at one and the same time. For this
reason, the notion of a slippery slope to secularization makes
no more sense in a Lutheran context than it does m a
Catholic context, and for very similar reasons.
While the Lutheran tradition possesses extraordinary
resources for sustaining the.life of the mind, the strength of
the Lutheran tradition is also its weakness. As we have
seen, the notion of paradox is central to the Lutheran
tradition, but it is all too easy to sacrifice one side of the
paradox in the interest of the other. When the paradox
dissolves in this way, the risks can be absolutism on the one
hand and relativism on the other.
These temptations are especially apparent when one
considers Luther's understanding of the two kingdoms. If
we accentuate the Kingdom of God at the expense of the
secular world, we run the risk of absolutizing our religious
vision. Here one thinks, for example, of the scholastic
theologians who absolutized the dynamic, paradoxical
qualities of Luther's thought into a rigid, airtight system. It
is safe to say that this version of Lutheran theology is simply
inimical to the life of the mind. Yet, rigid codification of
Lutheran thought occurs even within some Lutheran colleges
and universities.
On the other hand, if we accentuate the secular world at the
expense of the Kingdom of God, we run the risk of
relativism since we have diminished our transcendent point
of reference.
This means that if Lutheran colleges hope to draw on their
Lutheran heritage to sustain the life of the mind, they must
find some way to keep alive the heart and soul of Luther's
original vision, namely, the paradox of the Gospel and the

affirmation of the sovereignty of God and the finitude of
humankind.
Conclusion
Finally, I want to make a few observations regarding the
dilemmas Lutheran colleges and universities inevitably face
as they seek to interpret the Lutheran vision to potential
constituents.
In the first place, because the Lutheran tradition thrives on
paradox, ambiguity, thoughtfulness, and reflection, it is
difficult to explain a Lutheran institution that genuinely lives
out of the Lutheran worldview. As the director of
development for one Lutheran institution told me a couple of
years ago, "It's tough to market ambiguity." This is all the
more true in a "sound bite" culture such as ours. How can
one possibly explain a Lutheran institution to a potential
student or a potential donor in a sound bite?
While in one sense this may seem like a disadvantage for
Lutheran institutions, in another sense this may well be a
potential asset. Because Lutheran theological resources are
unique in the world of church-related higher education, and
because those resources can do so much to sustain the life of
the mind, Lutheran colleges and universities have the
potential to grow into absolutely first class institutions of
higher learning. This means that while Lutheran educators
may not be able to explain to potential donors or potential
students all the intricacies of a Lutheran worldview, they can
explain that Lutheran colleges and universities offer a first
class education where the life of the mind is nurtured, where
all questions are taken seriously, where critical thinking is
encouraged, and where a diversity of cultures are valued;
and that these virtues all grow from deep and profound
commitment to the Christian faith.
In my view, this is the niche-and it is a special niche
indeed-that Lutheran colleges and universities occupy in
the world of church-related higher education in the United
States.
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THE SKEPTICAL THEOLOGIAN'S DICTIONARY
Spencer Porter and Carl Skrade
A

B

answer noun I. A response to a question or the solution to
a problem. 2. In our times it has come to be assumed that
questions are defined in terms of their answers, but in
theology this is not so. In fact this disjunction is one cardinal
reason that both theological language and poetry are seen as
strange or even empty of content. We educate ourselves and
each other to search for answers; and when we encounter a
question which does not fit the mould, we have no idea of
what to do next. 3. In theology and in poetry the answers are
less important than the questions themselves, which are often
answered again and again yet never answered. Thus Jesus
asks Peter, "Who do you say that I am?" (Matthew 16: 15)
The dialogue which ensues is important, and Peter's answers
are interesting and informative; but the question stands on its
own quite apart from what Peter said. It is a sign, and an
unfortunate one at that, that the modem age has spilled tons
of blood over differing interpretations of the answers while
refusing to live in the mystery of the question. See problem
and question.

belief noun 1. The act of thinking that some story or
doctrine is true, based either on evidence accessible to all
or on some special insight available to only a few. 2.
While virtually no one wishes to believe either stories or
doctrines that are false, it is odd that belief is seen to be a
virtue. It is not, and elevating belief to a virtue generally
results in idolatry. "To believe falsely" seems to be an
oxymoron in all languages. 3. At its best belief is a bet
which hope places against the boxing with reality which
passes for thinking in most of the world. At its worst belief
comes from the fear which causes the boxing. Most of us
struggle with a mixture of the two, and the story of the man
with the epileptic son (Mark 9: 17-24) brings this into focus.
4. Those who would make belief itself into a virtue ought to
compare the demons who knew and believed without doubt
that Jesus was the Messiah (Mark 5:1-20 and many other
passages) to the apostles who were still m the dark at the end
of the story! (Mark 16: 11) 5. A common error is confusing
belief with faith (which see). This error is not innocent as
such belief shades into doctrine then dogma then rigid
orthodoxy then inquisition. Belief can and has become a
primary defense against newness, possibility, and freedom.
Such a defense has led in modem times to both violence and
depression, the twentieth century's diseases of choice. There
is little doubt that God prefers atheism to many of these
forms of belief. If this were not so, Jesus would not have
been as sharp with the demons as he always was. 6. It is
thought that it is differences in belief that divide the
churches, and theologians of all sorts claim to love the truth
and speak it and to hate error. It is not surprising in the least
that truth in one tradition will often coincide with error in
another. The real truth is that all of our dogmas are wrong
to some extent. A great scandal of the church is that
differences in belief - especially those that are difficult to
understand and explain - are used to divide the church. Since
the church is a human institution, these divisions must have
more to do with interests and property than with principles
of any kind. See faith.

ark noun l. An especially unseaworthy boat built by Noah,
who was not a seaman at all! (Genesis 9:20) For a time, it
is said, this boat contained the whole of the human race and
culture. God regretted ever having made this race, but for
some reason, never truly explained, he relented and saved
this small renmant. 2. The first of several demonstrations in
the Bible that God makes very odd choices when calling
people to vocations. It would seem that when it comes to
reading resumes God is without a clue.
3. The ark may also be seen as a metaphor for the church
and the graces which may be obtained by being within it:
much better than the alternative even if the stench is
ferocious!
Carl Skrade is Professor and Chair of the Dept. of Religion
at Capital. Spencer Porter has taught chemistry at
Concordia, Gustavus Adolphus, and Capital University
(among others). He now is a research chemist for the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.
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C
:'.'.church noun 1. On a mystical level the Body of Christ and
the company of all faithful people. 2. On the human level a
temporary and contingent organization. It is a sign of grace
and a sense of humor that God put up with it. The true
church may be described by the acronym from computer
science WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get). It is a
community - often shapeless and goalless - of those who
have been grasped by that awe-filled freedom for which
Christ has set us free. (Galatians 5: 1) 3. It is both sanctuary
and refuge, which entries see. At the church's best it is
possible to meet within its body, aware that everyone in it is
as much a sinner and is as much saved · and healed as
everyone else. 4. Eventually the church will be out of
business. There was no church in Eden (Genesis 2:15-25),
and there will be none in the new heaven either (Revelation
21:22). In the present time however, the church is an
institution or collection of them, which own property, has
laws and hierarchies, and quarrels with itself. Like all
institutions it can not imagine the world without itself, and
so it spends much of its energy perpetuating itself all the
while vainly imagining that the reign of God depends on
itself. It does not, and the Galilean carpenter whose name it
takes had no interest in institutions of any kind - except to
subvert those which held the people he loved in bondage.
comedy noun 1. A dramatic form designed to entertain by
calling on the lighter human emotions. As such, comedy may
use wit, buffoonery, ridicule, and satire to amuse - and
enlighten. Comedic stories have happy endings except for the
villains and butts of the jokes. 2. What a Bob Hope one-liner
is not, but what a Robin Williams one-liner is. 3. The
human story spiraling upward towards its unfolding and
fulfillment. 4. The 'yes' within the 'no,' the light within the
dark, the joy within brokenness. 5. The suddenness and
surprise of grace. 6. The holy joke which is sprung whenever
one realizes that what is needed is already in hand. 7. The
Bible contains a fair amount of comedy; and if pious folk did
not read it all so grimly, the book would be enjoyed much
more than it is. Examples are the story of Ruth, the story of
Gideon (Judges 6-8), several of the parables of Jesus, and
the Book of Revelation. See grace, parable, poetry and
tragedy.

F
fence noun 1. A barrier designed to separate pieces of God's
creation from his creatures. 2. The poet (R. Frost) said "that
good fences make good neighbors," but he was being ironic,
a fact missed by the majority of his readers. Fences offer the

illusion of . safety as they can for a time effect real
separation, but eventually what is being avoided will get in
somehow. 3. Several centuries ago churches came _to have
fences (known as altar or communion rails) inside to protect
the altar and the priest from wandering farm animals. Soon
the separation was between the clergy and the laity, and to
some extent that division persists to this day. To be sure,
certain members of the laity have been able to enter the area
inside, known as the chancel, but only under carefully
prescribed conditions. 5. At the time of the Reformation
most Protestant church leaders saw that the division was
artificial or worse, and the rails came down in most places.
Even in England the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas
Cranmer, decreed that the faithful surround the communion
table. This never caught on; Cranmer was burned at the
stake in 1555; and fences persist in Anglican churches to this
day. During the l 960's the Roman Catholic Church radically
changed their liturgy and their existing fences are now used
only rarely.

H
heaven noun 1. Imagined to be a place of eternal bliss in
spite of the fact that no one has sufficient imagination to
picture either bliss or eternity. Also thought to be somewhere
in the sky or beyond it. With our modem understanding of
the structure of the universe, this idea has become very
difficult to believe. Some imagine an existence after death
for the elect somewhere up, but it has become impossible to
see in these images much beyond the making of jokes.
Floating above pink clouds in a white gown with wings while
playing music on a golden harp does not strike the writers of
this dictionary as being interesting. 2. Heaven is often
imagined to be part of a system· of rewards and punishments
in which the just, or the faithful, or the chosen are given the
ultimate grand prize while the rest of us go to hell. All such
systems are individualistic and narcissistic, but they do
appeal to those who imagine themselves either among the
elect or among those who run the system. It is difficult to
comprehend the amount of fruitless anguish which has
consumed thosewho have worried over what might await
them after death. 3. Heaven is better seen as the state of
being completely in the sight and care of God while knowing
that such is the case. (Hell is being radically apart from God,
if such be possible.) Either heaven or hell is best seen as real
possibility in the now. 4. It is much more fruitful to use the
word and image of paradise. Paradise has no fixed location
or time in our witness, and we leave it to God to create such
a place and life. See hell and paradise.
hell noun 1. Thought to be a place of torment and the just
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desserts ofthe unfaithful. Such requires both an ill-tempered
and vengeful God and doubtful manipulations of scripture
and sensibility. These things come from imagining
extensions of narcissism beyond the grave. Nonetheless,
orthodox "keepers ofthe keys" place great stock in a system
of rewards and punishments. 2. In this individualistic age
many do imagine that one can be punished eternally for not
believing the right thing, for not doing the right thing, or for
not belonging to the right group. These views are held
chiefly by those who think that they believe the right thing,
do the right things, and belong to the one true church. We
have no wish to be judgmental, but it does strike us as at
least possible that the motives are self-justification and fear.
3. Actually to be in hell is to be forgotten by God and
unknown to God. It is not, however, clear that such a state
is possible even if that should be a person's deepest desire.
(Psalm 139: 7-12) Neither is it clear that any one of us
receives his or her just desserts. (Psalm 103: 8-14) 4. It is
much more likely that those who choose to flee from God
will get their wish - for a time. Nonetheless, it seems certain
that God will not cease to love them. If we have been
admonished to love our enemies (Matthew 5: 43-8), will not
God do the same for those who choose to be his enemies? 5.
It follows that both heaven and hell are vital symbols which
are bound neither to a linear sense of time nor to a system of
justice but which are ever present and intimate possibilities.
Ifwe try to move beyond this simple statement, we would be
attempting to change God from immeasurable mystery into
that which we can manage. See grace and heaven.

M
miracle noun 1. Describes any phenomenon in the natural
world which goes against the laws of nature, which is
beneficent, and which is, therefore, caused by a supernatural
being. 2. This is a modem definition which came into use
with William of Ockham in the fourteenth century, and it is
clear that the biblical writers had no such understanding.
The distinction between miraculous events and the rest
became prominent only after the Enlightenment when, as
Laplace remarked to Napoleon, the hypothesis of God was
no longer necessary. Miracle then emerged as supernatural
diddling with the laws of nature, congenially and
apologetically retaining a diminishing preserve for the action
ofa rational and domesticated God. See gaps. 3. Any event natural vs. supernatural is not the issue - which opens to and
drives home the truth about reality, about the relationship
between God and humanity. As such the miraculous is
always revelation, the laying bare of truth, and revelation is
always decreation. See monotheism. All things are potential
bearers of miracle. 4. The occurrences of the word in the

English Bible are few, and it is always possible to find
another word that is closer to the original, such as sign,
wonder, or act of power. 5. The great miracles in the
Christian tradition are the creation and the incarnation,
which entries see. Neither is plausible, likely, or reasonable,
but then neither is the very existence ofGod or anything else.
See metatheology and science.
Q

question noun 1. A sentence or statement which invites or
requires a response. 2. There are several varieties, but the
ones that are of the most interest to theology are often not
even seen as questions at all. 3. The most common types are
the ones that either have answers or the presumption of an
answer. Most of what passes for education in the modem
age consist oflearning to state the questions and expound the
answers. In this way both students and teachers can be
assessed, i.e., judged, and it becomes possible to reform and
improve education. Thus students in school will be sure that
Boise is the capital of Montana, and students in Sunday
School will be sure that Noah's wife was Joan of Ark, and
our educational professionals will know what to do. 4. On
another level other professionals will do research and find
new answers and perhaps even Joan's Ark. This will provide
new information and larger and larger libraries, and soon the
human race will know more stuff than it could ever use. 5.
Nonetheless, research in itself is more boon than bane, and
it can even be done on the biblical texts. Such is certainly
fine, and so it is that people ask questions of the Bible. They
expect answers too; for what else have they been educated?
At this point the witnesses of religion and history veer far
from the culture, and the people who live in that culture find
themselves in a strange land indeed. The Bible is filled with
questions, and so is the history, but they are of a wholly
different order. They may not even have "correct" answers,
and the skills ofprofessionals won't help either. The one who
goes to the text in search of answers to questions is very
likely to find that the text is asking rather than answering.
This is disconcerting to say the least, and the result is often
an even more diligent search for answers as if the text were
some giant puzzle which can only be solved by great effort.
The search is interesting, but ultimately ends where it began,
that is where the question from the text was encountered. 6.
Some examples will illustrate what happens. "What is
truth?" (John 18:38) [No answer is given.] ''What is his
(God's) name? ''What shall I say to them (the Israelites)?"
(Exodus 3: 13-4) [The answer given is beyond human
comprehension.] ''Who do you say that I am?" (Matthew
16: 15) [The answer is open; we may respond as we like. If
this were not so we would have no freedom worthy of the

Intersections/Winter 1998
13

term.] Sometimes the question is implied: "If you had faith
the size of a mustard seed, you could say to this mulberry
tree, 'Be uprooted and planted in the sea,' and it would obey
you." (Luke 17: 5-6) [Well? Probably not.] "Whoever does
not love abides in death." (lJohn 3: 14) [Again, well?] 7.
These questions are always open and honestly so. This is
rarely understood, and many earnest folk believe that all of
them are in the same class as "What is the capital of
Montana?" Those who are on the right side will, therefore,
study and learn the right answer. To be sure, some answers
are better than others, and Boise is in Idaho. It is, however,
much closer to the truth to say that God's freedom is a real
freedom (Galatians 5: 1) and not simply the freedom to chose
one's slave master. If this misunderstood and under
appreciated gift of God were truly taken for what it is, the
questions that we find, or which find us, could be seen for
what they are. See answer and puzzle.

s
saint noun 1. A person who is chosen by God for a life of
holiness. 2. This is both paradox and mystery because
holiness is a property of God alone and because no person is
capable of attaining it. Nonetheless, God does give special
gifts to certain sinners that make them markers of
God's holy actions in the world. The saint is given the gift
of sight as few of us have. 3. A saint has, therefore, a
profound sense of his or her own faults and sinfulness. In
the second place he or she refuses to let this condition
prevent the action that comes from being faithful, even as it
is well understood what the likely outcome will be. A living
saint is a sinner who has made significant progress in the
transformation from self-centeredness to reality and Being,
i.e., God. See martyr. 4. It is hard to imagine that anyone
could live a life of being a saint all the time, and it is like wise hard to imagine that anyone goes through life without

ever acquiring saintliness, at least for a time. 5. Dividing the
human race into saints and sinners makes very little sense.
Likewise with imagining that saints are dead sinners, whose
lives have been edited by selective memories. See sin and
holiness.
secular, the noun 1. The literal meaning is those things that
are in time, in the sense of chronos. See time. 2. The
antonym is the eternal, which stands for those things outside
of chronos but inside kairos (God's sense of time). 3. The
usual understanding is that the sacred is the opposite of the
secular, but this is an error. Everything in creation is good
and, therefore, sacred (Genesis 1 :31), so it can not be that
things within time are not good. 4. The distinctions made
between sacred and secular times are useful to human
beings, who after all have a dreadful time with Genesis 1: 31,
and God approves us. (Mark 2:23-8) 5. The secular may
also refer to things not of the church, and so it is possible to
refer to secular government or secular science simply to note
that the structure of the visible church, which too is sinful,
does not control these things. See profane and sacred.

T
trash noun I. That which is discarded as being of no use
and a chief result of modem commerce. A modem idol,
worshiped by nearly everyone, is economic growth, and a
clear measure of it is the amount of trash which a society
produces. If by some means we could devise an economic
system in which only what is needed would be purchased
and consumed, a great economic depression would occur. By
this logic trash is good. 2. In the logic of the biblical
witnesses, trash can not exist. Everything that God made is
good, indeed it is very good (Genesis 1:31), and it is only
human blindness which causes us to believe that any one
thing (or any one) is of no use or function.
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DISCUSSION:

THE UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF GOD:
BEYOND DIALECTICS AND RHETORIC
GREGORY A. CLARK

"I don't want to be deceived," he said. "I am looking to
Reason to keep me from illusion." Jerry was one of my
brightest philosophy majors. His father was a pastor.
Under the influence of higher criticism of the Bible and
Nietzsche, however, the effect of countless sermons and his
religious upbringing had diminished. Jerry was convinced
that his father was deceived and that Jerry himself had been
brought up in a faith that was little more than wishful
thinking. "Reason" was going to protect him from illusions
that might try to trap him later in life.

Any cnt1c1sm of the Enlightenment and contemporary
Christian higher education must consider the relation
postmodemism, (2) the ethic of love and peace espoused
by the Christian Church, and (3) the meeting of (1) and (2)
in the church-related college. I believe that we must think
about how to construct a university where the rhetorical
power of this dichotomy between rhetoric and dialectics no
longer holds the minds of students like Jerry.·· We must both
break down the dichotomy and learn to value the power of
words.

The dichotomy is common and ancient: truth opposes
illusion, reason opposes power, philosophy opposes rhetoric,
and real argument opposes merely verbal links in discourse.
Almost every philosopher since Plato, who sets out the
dichotomy in the Apology, dwells on these oppositions.
Interestingly, even those who chasten and restrict reason do
not hesitate to make the opposition and condemn rhetoric.
Alasdair MacIntyre offers up a familiar and representative
lamentation: "In the forums of popular life rhetorical
effectiveness in persuasion and manipulation prevails against
rational argument.." 1

Accordingly, I will begin with an account of Maclntyre's
proposal, in his book Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry, for a postliberal university. Maclntyre's postliberal
university institutionalizes the conflict of wills that
postmodemism claims is everywhere. I will then tum to
John Milbank's criticism of Maclntyre's position. According
to Milbank, Maclntyre's position is neither Christian nor
postmodern. I will sketch a part of Milbank's criticism of
MacIntyre in order to show some problems with taking the
postliberal university as a model for a church-related
college. Finally, I will offer a modest proposal for the form
of discourse the should prevail in a church-related college.

The concepts of "power" and "violence" provide the basis for
the opposition. According to philosophy, rhetoric values
effectiveness and power, regardless of the rational merits of
the case. Violence destroys or tears apart integrity -- the
integrity of the will, of the mind, of the body. Rhetorical
power becomes violent when it does not respect the
rationality and will of the hearer, when it aims to impose the
will of the speaker on the hearer.
While traditional philosophers want to avoid violence,
postmodern philosophers think that violence is unavoidable,
but that some forms of violence are better than others. That
is, philosophers like Nietzsche and Deleuze maintain the
dichotomy, but they defend the sophists. Everything is the
will to power. Dialectical argument merely disguises the
will that seeks to dominate other wills. It is not on that
account less a will.
Gregory A. Clark teaches in the Philosophy Department at
North Park University.

I.
The Postliberal University
In his Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, Alasdair
MacIntyre distinguishes three types of universities. The
preliberal university of 18th and 19th century Scotland and
the United States could assume a fairly homogeneous and
well-educated public. Aided by religious tests to exclude
and promote faculty 1, it was able to advance considerably.
The preliberal university produced a constrained agreement.
The liberal university claims to open its doors to all. By
doing away with religious tests, it would promote progress
and agreement in all areas of knowledge. The liberal
university, then, claims to produce an unconstrained
agreement. In fact, however, we can now see that the liberal
university does impose constraints.
Further, these
constraints have cost the liberal university the resources to
understand and to justify its own existence.
If we cannot return to the constrained agreement of the
preliberal university, nor to the feigned unconstrained
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Rationality?6 shows that he is too much the philosopher and
not sufficiently Christian or postmodern. Dialectics is itself
a form of the will to power. Insofar as MacIntyre does not
realize this, he has not yet crossed the bridge of
postmodemity. Insofar as he still appeals to dialectics, he
remains within an ontology of violence and has not yet taken
up the cross of Christian peace.

agreement of the liberal university, where shall we go?
MacIntyre suggests that we should develop a university
system that will be a "place of constrained disagreement, or
imposed participation in conflict, in which a central
responsibility of higher education would be to initiate
students into conflict."2 What would this look like?
MacIntyre continues,
Surely a set ofrival universities would result, each modeled
on, but improving upon, its own best predecessor. ...And
thus the wider society would be confronted with the claims
ofrival universities, each advancing its own enquiries in its
own terms and each securing the type of agreement
necessary to ensure the progress and flourishing of its
enquiries by its own set ofexclusions and prohibitions ...
. But then also required would be a set of institutionalized
forums in which the debate between rival types of enquiry
was afforded rhetorical expression. 3

I am interested in the second criticism for the purposes of
this essay. That is, I want to ask if violence and conflict are
necessary and constitutive parts of the life of the mind. If
dialectics is itself the embodiment of conflict, how might we
begin to think differently? In what follows, I will first draw
the distinction between the ontology of violence and the
ontology of peace. I will then contrast Macintyre's Thomist
postliberal university with the church-related college.
A.
Counter Ontologies
An ontology of violence posits a primordial conflict that
politics, morality, and dialectics each attempt to overcome or
limit with another act of violence. Milbank finds an
"ontology of violence" in the philosophy and institutions of
the ancients, the modems, and the postmodems. Since the
ancients and the postmodems are committed to an ontology
of violence, Maclntyre's choice between Aristotle and
Nietzsche does not present us with true alternatives.

Madntyre's postliberal university has two tiers, both of
which emphasize constraint and conflict. First, the
university must establish its own identity. This university
will look much like the preliberal university that embodies a
constrained agreement. That is to say, arguments alone are
not enough to establish agreement; there must be some
authority to enforce agreement. For the Thomist university,
this authority will be the church, and ultimately the Pope.4

In contrast with the history of philosophy, Milbank finds an
"ontology of peace" expressed in Augustine's The City of
God. Peace is a harmonious agreement based in charity.
Christianity posits an ontology of peace because God is the
most basic reality, and the God of Christians is a God who
is love in trinity and who created the universe out of
generosity and love. Milbank argues that only Christianity
provides an ontological option to violence. The church is
that society which promotes and incarnates the charity made
possible through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.

This is not a simple sectarianism, however. Maclntyre's
sketch of the university is an attempt to institutionally
embody a tradition and to allow for dialogue between other
mstitutionalized versions of moral enquiry. If this were
sectarian, they would never come into contact with each
other. So, second, the universities in the system need to
engage in open hostilities on a level fighting field. In spite of
the claim, in Three Rival Versions, that this conflict will
have a rhetorical expression, Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? clearly indicates that these conflicts are
mediated dialectically. Moral enquiry progresses, according
to MacIntyre, through open argument both within a
tradition and across traditions. The best tradition will be
able to solve the problems of other traditions and be able to
account for the failure of the inferior tradition. Let us then
defme the postliberal university as a place of dialectically
mediated conflict and constrained agreement. Such is the
postmodern opportunity for the university according to
MacIntyre.

B.
Counter Universities
While Milbank does not consider the implications of his ..
criticism for a university or for a church-related college, one
might easily generate a series of questions that extend th.
criticism to Maclntyre's proposal fro the postlibe
university. Is a "place of constrained disagreement, ·
imposed participation in conflict" compatible with a soci
founded on an ontology of peace? Can a higher educati
that is Christian both attend to its identity withinJ
Christian tradition and engage in open hostilities . .
instituted in the postliberal university? Can a postlib(
university exist in the City of God?

II.
The City of God
MacIntyre has come under attack by John Milbank in his
Theology and Social Theory. 5 According to Milbank,
Maclntyre's move to dialectics in Whose Justice? Which
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If Macintyre's post-liberal university and the church-related
college are rooted in mutually exclusive categories, then the
postliberal university would amount to an institutionalized
hostility to Christian identity. To take Maclntyre's
postliberal university as the model for the church-related
college would be to forfeit the college's identity in the
mission of the church. I will argue that Maclntyre's
postliberal university is modeled on an ontology of violence
insofar as it defines itself by dialectical argument. The
church-related college articulates an ontology of peace
insofar as it embodies a history of faith and persuasion.
L
The Thomist University
Consider first the Thomist postliberal university. Thomism,
for MacIntyre, is part of the history of philosophy or
intellectual history.7 He reads Thomas, in the end, as a
philosopher rather than as a theologian whose work reflects
the faith and practice of the church. Thomism is a set of
beliefs, an intellectual position, an extended dialectical
argument, that is, a tradition.
A Thomism instituted in a postliberal university requires
conflict. This conflict 1s mediated dialectically. Otherwise
said, dialectic is the intellectual management of conflict.
The Platonic dialogues, Aristotle's method, and Thomas's
method show dialectics as the attempt to bring many
competing voices into a unified harmony.8 This unified
harmony is the Idea of the Good and of peace. 9
Postmodemism asks whether dialectics can bring about such
harmony. Socrates and Plato face this question when they
confront the Sophists, and Aristotle confronts it as well,
since "good" can be said in many ways. Plato, Aristotle, and
many Thomisms were not entirely successful in achieving a
harmony through dialectical means. Neither did the
preliberal or liberal university succeed. While MacIntyre
appeals to dialectics, agreement within the postliberal
Thomist university is itself guaranteed by a decree of the
Pope. If dialectics cannot establish harmony, "then only a
merely 'effective' peace is possible, a 'secular' peace of
temporarily suspended violence or regulated competition." 10
That is, the conflict is only resolved by one party imposing
their will on another.
2.
The Church-Related College
Contrast the Thomist university with the nature of the
church-related college. The church-related college differs
from non-affiliated colleges in that it serves the mission of
the church in some way. The church is the community of
those people whose lives have been claimed by the God who
is love and peace. The preeminence of the peace of the

Lord, however, is not established or shown dialectically, by
managing conflict through argument.
Rather, it 1s
established by God in Jesus, and it is shown in the life and
preaching of the church. Phillips Brooks says,
However, the Gospel may be capable of statement in
dogmaticform, its truest element we know is not in dogma
but in personal l�fe. Christianity is Christ; and we can
easily understand how a truth which is of such a peculiar
character that a person can stand forth and say of it, "I am
the Truth," must always be best conveyed through, must
indeed be almost incapable of being perfectly conveyed
except through, personality. And so some form al
preaching must be essential to the prevalence and spread
of the knowledge of Christ among men. II
Note two interrelated points. First, while dogmas are
important and necessary, the church is not founded on
dogma or a set of articles. Second, and this is crucial, this
first point does not mean that we stop preaching. Jesus
preached: Peter and Paul preached. In preaching, the church
takes its native form. As a form of discourse, preaching's
primary goal is not to establish any given set of ideas. The
truth of the gospel is the person of Jesus, and this truth is
communicated through the personality of the preacher as he
or she preaches. Preaching articulates a counter-logos which
is neither dialectical or sophistical rhetoric. It is more
original than either. The Christian logos gives "pride of
place to opinion (doxa), testimony (marturia) and
persuasion (pistis). " 12 The God of peace is revealed through
the power of the Word.
Both of these points help to clarify the difference between
the Thomist university and the church-related college. The
church-related college is not founded on any one doctrine or
school of thought, and its goal is not to produce more and
better scholars. Perhaps Thomism is a tradition of moral
enquiry: Christianity is not. While Christianity has much to
say about the things that concerned philosophers, it is not on
that account oriented and guided by philosophy. Christianity
is not one more competing vision of the good life. It is not
graspable through dialectics; it is not itself promulgated
through dialectics. It is a mode of discourse aiming to reveal
the God of peace with whom the apostles were acquainted.
"Perhaps," Milbank says, "we have to take more seriously
the Biblical narratives ... which presumably tell how things
happened in the very idiom adopted by their users for the
making-of-things-to-happen." 13
Further, this "idiom," this preaching that humans can now be
reconciled to God and to each other, contains an acid that
cannot be neutralized by philosophical systems or
arguments, and this too can be seen in the preaching of the
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apostles. John Howard Yoder observes that the apostles did
not request "free speech and room for one more stand in the
Athenian marketplace of ideas for a new variant of already
widely respected diaspora Judaism." Rather,
A handful of messianic Jews, moving beyond the defenses
of their somewhat separate society to attack the intellectual
bastions of majority culture, refused to contextualize their
message by clothing it in the categories the world held
ready. Instead, they seized the categories, hammered them
into other shapes, and turned the cosmology on its head.
. . The development of a high Christology is the natural
cultural ricochet of a missionary ecclesiology when it
collides as it must with whatever cosmology explains and
governs the world. 14
In the arena of ideas, Christians do not fight fairly. Which
is to say that they don't fight. They do not pit Christian
ideas against non-Christian ideas. Rather, they introduce the
person of Christ who is irreducible to any and all ideas.
Christianity will always oppose the absoluteness and
adequacy of every system or idea, while refusing itself to be
reduced to a system or an idea. Philosophy will always find
Christianity an unassimilatable phenomenon. Like the Son
of Man, Christianity is nomadic. It is the reef upon which
the ships of idolatrous philosophies are wrecked. The effect
of this preaching, Yoder insists, is an intellectual pluralism
and relativism, for
pluralism/relativism is a confusing world, but it is not an
alien one. It is the child of the Hebrew and Christian
intervention in cultural history. It is the spinojf from
missionary mobility, from the love of the enemy, from the
relativizing of political sovereignty, from a dialogical
vision of the church,.from a charismatic vision of the many
members of the body, from the disavowal of empire and
theocracy. It lays b�fore us the challenge of convincing
interlocutors who are not our dependents, of affirming a
particular witness to be good news without being interested
in showing that other people are bad. 15
The Christian witness, like the Word about which it testifies,
is active and affirming. Conflict with and reaction to "other
views" does not constitute the first move or have priority. 16
The first move in the Christian witness is not our move at
all. Rather, God comes and reveals himself to us as love.
Our response to God's love constitutes the second move.
The second move is not exclusively or primarily a matter of
intellectual assent but an obedience expressed in love for
one's neighbor. This is the essentially active and affirming
nature of the Word and of the preaching of Christian
witness. Only such a Word and such a witness can embody
an affirmation of power that is non-violent.

This non-violent affirmation precedes the violence of both
rhetoric and dialectics, as well as the violence embodied in
the dichotomy between rhetoric and dialectics. That is, the
Christian witness refuses to impose its will on others, either
dialectically or rhetorically (I Cor. I: 17, 2: 13), for this is the
way God treats us. 17 This feature of the Christian witness
prevents the church-related college from taking the
postliberal university as an acceptable model.
MacIntyre himself catches sight of part of the problem when
he ceases to play the role of the philosopher. He claims "this
divorce between rhetorical effectiveness and rational
argumentation is deeply at odds with the thirteenth-century
Dominican ideal, especially as articulated by Aquinas, in
which the homily was to be the end-product of an education
in philosophy and theology." 18 The divorce also runs
counter to the self-understanding and goals of many of those
who founded our church-related colleges, not for training
scholars capable of engaging successfully in dialectical
warfare, but for preparing those capable of being witnesses
(µap·rnpEc;) of Jesus.
The affirmative message of Christian preaching does
respond to "other views," but only as a third moment in the
Christian witness. These other positions are not merely
"unjustified," or "an expression of (bad) power," but
"idolatrous." The category of idolatry indicates that the
problem is not so much intellectual confusion or dullness,
but our disordered loves. These disordered loves can keep
us from confronting God as a person, rather than as an idea,
and they bar us from full participation in the City of God.
Preaching introduces disordered lovers to the God who is
love. The church-related college, taking its guide from the
preaching of the church, seeks to educate our desires and set
them in order.

III.
Conclusion
Jerry, the student to whom I referred above, understood
Christianity as a set of beliefs that have an absolute status.
He thought that he had lost his faith when he exchanged one
set of absolute ideas for another set of equally absolute
ideas. The first set of ideas had been instilled in his mind
rhetorically; the second set imparted dialectically. He
thought that "Reason" stood outside of all power and could
save him from "illusion."
Neither the liberal or the postliberal university have the
resources to respond to Jerry's loss of faith, for they are
rooted in a dialectically managed conflict of ideas. That is,
postmodernism shows us that dialectics, rhetoric, and the
opposition between them all assume a form of violence. By
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institutionalizing these forms of discourse, both the liberal
and postliberal universities ultimately underwrite an
unavoidable violence.
The God worshiped by Christians is a God of love and
peace. Thus, the church-related college must institutionally
embody an ontology of non-violence both in what it says and
in its mode of speaking. The message proclaimed by
Christians, therefore, takes the form of preaching. Preaching
calls for a transformation of the entire person. The truths of
Christianity are not known cheaply or without personal risk.
The church-related college, if it is to train preachers, must
educate not the minds of students to be scholars, but the
loves and desires of persons to be a preacher.
The Christian witness will not always convince modernist
students like Jerry.
It will not overwhelm the
postmodernists. This is the risk it takes in affirming non
violence. In a postmodern era, it is this affirmation that
provides the church-related college with its most valuable
resource.
NOTES
l. Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry (Notre Dame,
1990) 168.
2. MacIntyre says "Cleghorn was rightly preferred to Hume
for the chair in moral philosophy at Edinburgh" (TRY, 224).
3. TRY, 230-1.
4. TRY, 234.
5. This is Macintyre's position in Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? (Notre Dame, 1988). See Martha Nussbaum's
review ofMacJntyre's position in "Recoiling from Reason,"
New York Review ofBooks (7 December 1989)36-41.
6. Blackwell, 1993.

7. MacIntyre is less dialectical, I think, in both After Virtue
and in Three Rival Versions.
8. MacIntyre does insist on the importance of various
practices for an intellectual tradition. Nevertheless, he fails
to show how Christian theology emerges out of the life and
the practices of the Church.
9. Milbank, 337.
10. Milbank, 335.
11. Milbank, 334.
12. Phillips Brooks, The Joy ofPreaching (Grand Rapids:
Kregel Publications, 1989) 27. This means that books, e
texts, the world wide web, or video courses are less than
adequate for the nature of Christian truth.
13. Milbank, 328.
14. Milbank, 121.
15. Yoder, "But We Do See Jesus," The Priestly Kingdom:
Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, 1984) 54.
16. Yoder, 60.
17. My concern here is motivated in part by Nietzsche,
Toward a Genealogy of of Morals, Essay I, X. See also
Paul Ricoeur, "Negativity and Primary Affirmation,"
History and Truth (Northwestern University Press, 1965)
305-328.
18. See Pascal's Pensees for the development of this theme.
19. TRV, 169. While I do not want to identify the homily
with the various form that preaching may take, it is perhaps
an ideal that can orient us.
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A RESPONSE TO GREGORY CLARK
A God of Peace and Love? - Reflections From a Biblical Scholar
Karla G. Bohmbach
As a member of this journal's editorial board, one of my
duties is to read and evaluate articles submitted for
publication as they are sent my way by the editor, Tom
Christenson. When I read Gregory Clark's article, I thought
definitely that we should publish it. My main comment to
Tom was that it would be greatly desirable to solicit
respondents who might interrogate further the practicality of
Clark's proposal for church-related colleges. In the back of
my mind, as I made that comment to Tom, I thought of how
much I was looking forward to reading such responses when
the issue came out. Tom had other ideas. He requested a
response from me. What has resulted is actually some
questions, derived mainly from my work as a scholar of
biblical studies. I hope such questions prompt further
comment - and further questions! - from readers.
Gregory Clark affirms the stance taken by John Milbank that all philosophies and institutions, whether ancient,
modem, or postmodern, are built on an ontology of violence.
In this way a critique is made of Alasdair Maclntyre's
position concernmg the postmodern liberal university, which,
for MacIntyre, would be a place of constrained agreement
(and so, presumably, non-violent). The problem for Clark,
who is following Milbank here, is that such a university,
insofar as it engaged with other "institutionalized versions of
moral enquiry" would remain within an ontology of violence.
For these engagements would be managed dialectically, and
dialectics can never lead to harmony but, at most, only a sort
of managed conflict which, in the end, is still violent.
Instead of an ontology of violence, Clark desires an ontology
of peace. He argues that such an ontology of peace is to be
found in the person of Jesus, the person who preeminently
reveals "the God who is love and peace." As a biblical
scholar, my reaction is to interrogate the ways in which
Jesus did, and did not, reveal such a God.
Jesus lived in a violent world. And far from shying away
from that world and its violence, he seems to have
deliberately opened himself up to it. Although his message
was greeted frequently with suspicion, skepticism, and
Karla G. Bohmbach is Assistant Professor of Religion at
Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, Pa.

vilification, he did not back down or retreat from it, even
when, as one account has it, the people of his own hometown
attempted to kill him (Luke 4: 14 - 30). Eventually he set his
face toward Jerusalem, even though he knew the sharp
opposition facing him there from the religious authorities.
And, once in Jerusalem, he engaged in an act that most see
as the precipitating event of his final suffering: the
overturning of the moneychangers' tables in the Temple
itself. Although it may not have been as physically violent as
has been depicted in such movies as Jesus Christ Superstar,
the act at least had overtones of violence. Not only, then,
does Jesus receive violence onto himself, here, at least, he
actually imposes it on others. Jesus' violence begets further
violence, now enacted against him, as he is arrested, tried,
scourged, and crucified - a sequence of events which, by
all accounts, was horrifically violent.
Not only was violence a part of Jesus' life, he also warned
his followers that such would be their fate:
"Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth;
I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have
come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against
her mother and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law;
and one's foes will be members of one's own household"
(Matt. 10: 34-36; cf. Luke 12: 51-53).
If, indeed, the God who is found in Jesus is a God of love
and peace, it seems that the love and peace comes about in
and through the acceptance of violence - and the suffering
that often accompanies such violence. The events of the
Passions, which lie at the very center of Jesus' life and
mission, are an overwhelming witness to Jesus' ready
acceptance of, and patient bearing of, the violence being
inflicted upon him. Followers of Jesus forget this at their
own peril, for the message to them, too, is that if love and
peace will be constitutive of their lives, such will not occur
unaccompanied by, or exclusive of, violence.
If we do as Gregory Clark urges us to do, and proclaim
Jesus on our campuses, what would that look like? In
particular, what would it mean if we took to heart the Jesus
who made himself vulnerable to the violence of his world?
We, too, live in a violent world. Dare we look unblinkingly
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college campuses related to the church, how might our tasks
be affected, even altered, by a serious living out of the
words.

into the face of such violence, take it upon ourselves, and
even, if called upon to do so, bear up and suffer in some way
because ofit? As staff, administrators, and teachers on

WHAT I HAVE LEARNED: MAYBE PLATO WAS RIGHT
Richard Yivisaker

PRELIMINARY EXAMPLES

Power By Competing Interests, It Has To Be Assumed
That There Is A Moral Basis For Politics Which
Transcends Special Interests.
Indeed, even the rightful pursuit ofpower on behalf of a
. particular interest assumes this. In our commitment to
democratic politics we may reject some or all of the extreme
measures to which Plato is led by this assumption. But the
challenge of constructing a democratic process consistent
with it is great. This may not mean, as it did for Plato, that
the challenge is unmeetable. But the reduction of democracy
to a naked or thinly disguised struggle for power parades
itself daily. 2 Plato knew a difficult problem when he saw
one.

(1) Communities Are Not Necessarily Better Off By
Becoming More Diverse.

(3) The Much-Derided Dualism of Body And Soul
Contains A Measure Of Truth.

We do not have to accept the vision of social differentiation
and hierarchy idealized in the Republic to see the truth in
Plato's view that a good society requires unity in diversity.
Diversity. may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. It
contains the seeds ofdiscord and disintegration along with
the potential for enriched life, as homogeneity brings unity
while threatening loss of vitality and decay .. Everything
depends on the wedding of diversity to some unity of
purpose. We may accept Charles Taylor's notion that a
''presumption" of value is owed to any deeply rooted
culture, but this presumption has to be tested in an
encounter of cultures whose outcome is uncertain. 1 This
requires a commitment to such encounter on the part of the
community, and this commitment is. the unity of purpose
which constitutes the community. If we were to turn our
attention to the call for increased diversity at colleges of the
church, creating the necessary unity in diversity would be
a major task. It is not a matter of simple addition.

Even ifwe take the radical dualism in Phaedo at face value,
there is more to be said for it than fashionable criticism
allows. We want to say, of course, that the very idea of
disembodied existence is both unappealing and barely
conceivable (if conceivable at all). But this does not remove
the problems of embodied life which rightly concerned
Plato.

A popular view ofPlato holds that his world view has had
a great and largely detrimental influence while being
transparently false. I have not been immune to this oddly
dismissive attitude. It is with no little surprise, in fact, that
I have gradually come to see that Plato may have been
right. About everything? No. About some important things,
however, clearly yes. I want to fix on one point in
particular, a point which reverberates in a special way for
those who inhabit the academic world. But first a brief
consideration of some other points where Plato had an
insight that merits preserving.

Of particular interest is his worry about the impact of
embodiment on our cognitive life. For embodied creatures
awareness ofthe world is mediated by organs which register
and transmit sensory data. This leads to diverse points of
view, depending on species nature, on individual physiology
and psychology, on space-time location, and on cultural
factors carried by language. The hope of liberating rational
consciousness from such dependence may strike us as
fanciful if not preposterous. As may the idea that we can
aspire to a form of consciousness which is without any
point ofview and thus god-like. But bridging differences in
point of view is a cognitive (and moral) imperative for us.
So also, then, is discovering a process which in some way
makes this possible. Plato saw all of this with great clarity.
The point here is related to the earlier ones about morality

(2) If Politics Is. To Be More Than A Struggle For
Richard Yivisaker is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at
Luther College.
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and politics and unity in diversity, and it brings us to the
idea that I have come to see as Plato's deepest.
TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF DISCOURSE
Another surprise for me over the years has been discovering
the strength of the penchant for doctrinaire pronouncement
among academic people. Our fondness for mere opinion, in
other words. Deconstructionists and Foucaultians will smile
knowingly at my belated loss of innocence. But we needn't
be deterred by their deflation of rational discourse as an
illusion masking some will to power or fear of the free play
of interpretation. Either they must defend their deflationary
strategy incoherently (with an appeal to reasoned argument)
or they offer us no reason to accept it. So we are free to
reconsider Plato's commitment to the dynamics of reason.
The distinction between knowledge and opinion is central to
the Republic. It was Plato's way of repudiating the
reduction of knowledge to power or to groundless
interpretation. Without this distinction the search for solid
moral judgment is meaningless and the good life therefore
impossible. Surely Plato was right about this. If personal
or collective opinion is the last word, the true and the good
are defined simply by our assent and thus become
dispensable notions, except as tools of persuasion which
work only until they are unmasked.
On the other hand, Plato's use of this distinction is
problematic. Taking it as a given epistemically, he makes it
call for a parallel and equally sharp distinction between the
objects of knowledge and opinion: they cannot be distinct
purchases on reality unless they are about different realities.
Epistemology thus entails metaphysics. In this way the
original distinction produces a fundamental divide between
stable, mind-transcending models or exemplars (the Forms)
and the space-time particulars which are their images.
We are rightly suspicious ofthe claim that knowledge and
opinion cannot be about the same objects, even ifwe agree
that epistemically there is a qualitative difference between
them. But Plato's mistake is not the blatant one it is often
taken to be. Crucial marks ofknowledge cannot be detached
from metaphysical considerations. For example, legitimate
claims to know must be supported by good reasons, by
"reasoned discourse" or "a reasoned account of reality"
which can "survive all refutations," as Socrates puts it in
Republic VU. If we grant this, we cannot avoid the
question: About what sort of reality is it possible to have
"reasoned discourse"? Which puts us firmly on the path of

metaphysics. So Plato's attempt to harvest metaphysical hay
from the field ofcommon-sense epistemology has something
to be said for it.
More important, however, is the way questions about the
links between knowledge, reasoned discourse, and reality
are embedded for Plato in questions about the good
community. Epistemology and metaphysics are inseparable
from ethics. Even ifwe are skeptical about his metaphysical
enterprise and suspicious of the social and ontological
hierarchies to which it leads, we do well to ponder his
insistence on the link between reasoned discourse and
community. For the larger society his vision of a
community built on reasoned discourse may be utopian; for
an academic community it should not be. It matters especially in such a community - how the views we hold are
supported and defended. Being right is not enough: better
to be wrong with good reason than right with bad ( or no)
reasons. So I have slowly learned. This may seem obvious,
too obvious to have to be learned. But in my experience
tough-mindedness about the pedigree of your own beliefs,
especially the ones you hold dear, is not easy to come by. 3
TWO CASES
Possible examples of the difficulty are legion. I choose two
which are of particular interest to me. In each case the
choice reflects my confidence both about an important truth
and about the negligence of a particular defense of it
( l) The Death Penalty Is Wrong And Should Be
Abolished.
I have little doubt about the truth of this, though the tide m
our country is running the other way. However, I have even
less doubt about bad defenses of this truth. I pick one such
defense, though a variety is ready to hand; and I pick it
because it is close to home.
The E.L.C.A. is in the practice of issuing social statements
on major public issues. These statements become the basis
for continued discussion in the church and for public policy
advocacy. A minimal requirement is that the positions they
adopt be defended carefully and honestly, that no shortcuts
be taken to make them appear self-evident. An egregious
failure to meet this requirement is provided by the church's
1991 statement on the death penalty. 4 Anyone who has
really thought about this issue knows that the strongest case
for retaining the death penalty is based on the demand for
just retribution. It presses such questions as these: What
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penalty "fits" or is "deserved by" the uniquely heinous
crime of first degree murder? What punishment adequately
upholds the community's consensus about the depth of the
wrong committed by a brutal taking of innocent life? This
case for the death penalty needs to be taken seriously by
any convincing case against it: Can the demand for just
retribution be met without recourse to the death penalty? If
so, how? Is that demand itself misguided? If so, why?
There is more than one way of minimizing this challenge. A
common one is to equate just retribution with vengeance.
For the E.L.C.A.'s social statement, however, the challenge
hardly exists. Though it repeatedly cites justice as a goal of
the church's social action, the statement shows scant
understanding of distinctions which are crucial to
understanding this goal. In the brief section on "Doing
Justice,"5 we find the following:
Violent crime is, in part, a reminder of human failure to
ensure justice for all members of society. People often
respond to violent crime as though it were exclusively a
matter of the criminal's individual failure. The death
penalty exacts and symbolizes the ultimate personal
retribution.
Yet, capital punishment makes no provable impact on the
breeding grounds of violent crime. Executions harm
society by mirroring and reinforcing existing injustice.
The death penalty distracts usfrom our work toward a just
society. . . It perpetuates cycles of violence.
The statement then calls for "an assault on the root causes
of violent crime" and asserts without argument that
problems of fairness in the administration of the death
penalty are insurmountable. Finally, we are told that
The practice of the death penalty undermines any possible
moral message we might want to 'send. ' It is not fair and
fails to make society better or safer. The message
conveyed by an execution . . . i's one of brutality and
violence. 6
In a few lines the demand for just retribution is first
slighted, then confused with different concerns, and finally
obliterated. It is hard to imagine less regard for reasoned
discourse. The presupposition ofthe argument, if there is an
argument, is that the primary agent of crime is society, the
alleged criminal being more a victim than a perpetrator of
injustice. This presupposition is not self-evident; it needs to
be argued. And it needs to be argued case by case-unless we

fall back on a social determinism which removes all
responsibility and with it any role for the notions of justice
and injustice. This, too, would need to be argued.
(2) We Must Extend The Boundaries Of Moral Concern
Beyond Humanity To Encompass All Of The Natural
World.
I find this imperative as compelling as the one about the
death penalty. It certainly is unproblematic within a
theocentric ethic: "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness
thereof." But how make it compelling to resistant non
theists?
Consider a recent attempt in this direction: Larry
Rasmussen's Earth Community Earth Ethics. 7 Though there
is much to admire in Rasmussen's book, it provides another
example of the failure to offer compelling reasons for a
strongly held position. We may agree with Rasmussen's
judgment that a way of life tied to a consumption-driven,
globally expanding market economy is unsustainable and
that its threat to ecological well-being is growing
exponentially, and agree as well that the urgency of the
situation calls for a paradigm shift in our moral thinking.
But how are we to ground the necessary shift? Showing its
utility is one thing; grounding it is something else.
Rasmussen attempts to ground it in two ways. One is by
expanding the realm of sentient life, life capable of
experiencing pain; the other, as his title suggests, is by
enlarging our view of community. Each fails even
moderately stringent tests of rationality. The unintended
result is to tum Rasmussen's brief for a non-homocentric
ethic on its head.
There is no phrase more often repeated in his book than
''earth's distress." The less dramatic variants include
"creation's pain," "the cry of the earth," "nature's
suffering." Sometimes God is the one who is said to suffer
as a result of nature's degradation. More typically, however,
"earth," "nature," or "creation" itself is viewed as the
subject of suffering. This way of speaking serves to make
all of creation the focus of moral regard and to awaken
compassion for it. But what is the basis for adopting such
language? Rasmussen offers only constant use of the
language, intimating that refusal to adopt it is a sign of
homocentric arrogance. Emphatic reassertion, in other
words, rather than argument. It would indeed be arrogance
to deny suffering to nature where observable behavior
displays it. But where there is no such behavior, the
attribution of suffering becomes moralizing sentimentality.
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Rasmussen's other attempt to ground a radical revision of
our moral framework fails similarly: the natural world is
charactenzed in a way which encourages the revision, but
little rationale is offered for it beyond the characterization
itself. This time the language is that of "cosmic
community," "earth community," "the community of life,"
"creation as a genuine community," "nature as both the
aboriginal and comprehensive community." Such phrases
are used again and again as the basis for a "comprehensive
communitarian ethic. "8
The thinness of Rasmussen's argument is revealed as soon
as we ask how "community" is to be understood. The
difficulty he faces is that this concept must have moral
import and yet be comprehensively applicable. The latter
requirement is satisfied by explicating "community" in
broad relational terms. We hear about the "internal
relatedness and interdependence of creation," the
"interconnectedness . . . among all things," and the
"intricate togetherness of things." Talking this way is
convincing as long as we understand it in causal terms. It
is no accident that Rasmussen appeals to the discoveries of
natural science to ground his communitarian view of nature.
But causal interdependence, simply as such, lacks moral
import. Rasmussen unwittingly exposes the. crucial non
sequitur: "The goodness of life together and the reciprocity
learned in genuine community create moral agency and
responsibility."9 A community in which reciprocity is
learned is indeed a moral community; but the
mterdependence which holds it together is more than causal,
a kind of interdependence we have been given no reason to
apply to the cosmos.
Aldo Leopold fell into the same error m his classic
expression of this communitarian vision.
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that
the individual is a member of a community of
interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete
for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him
also to co-operate . . . The land ethic simply enlarges the
f
boundary o the community to include soils, waters, plants,
and animals, or collectively: the land. 10
Ethics requires the context of community and community
requires an interdependence of cooperating members. But
the land (in Leopold's sense) is not such a community. The
mutuality essential to cooperation and hence to moral
community is absent.

Rasmussen and Leopold take a concept whose moral
pregnancy derives from a human context and extend it
beyond that context without supporting evidence.
Equivocating on the word "community," they end up
attacking a homocentric bias in ethics with a conceptual
move which is itself deeply homocentric. Ironically,
reconceiving the natural world in our image has become the
basis for reconceiving ourselves in nature's image. 11 The
result is an expanded moral vision supported by no good
reason. Little more than mere opinion, Plato would have
said. And he would have been right.
THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES
Why should we care about having good reasons for our
beliefs?12 Well, the likelihood of having true beliefs is
enhanced by good reasons. That is, good reasons make it
more likely that my beliefs reflect the way things really are
and not merely the way I want them to be. Suppose,
however. that we reject the very idea of "the way things
really are"; or we say that what matters about a view of the
cosmos is not whether it is objectively true but whether it
supports a preferred moral vision, or that moral visions do
not need grounding in the way things really are.
Plato, of course, would demur on all of these suppositions.
But assume that there is something to be said for them.
Even then Plato would continue to defend the demand for
good reasons since reason .lli. linked to the possibility of fl
community of discourse. Disdain good reasons and you risk
losing this possibility. i3 Reason fosters such a community
because it is by nature dialectical. Provoking us to discover
incoherence in our beliefs, it leads us to uncover the
assumptions on which they rest and to subject these
assumptions to critical scrutiny. In this way it pulls us
toward the vision of a ground which can compel the assent
of all who reach it and thus bind us together. But this
movement has to be governed by the mutuality it seeks;
hidden contradictions and underlying assumptions do not
yield readily to a solitary mind. The dialectic of reason is
of necessity dialogical.
Here, then, is the fundamental insight: Offering reasons to
support our beliefs and caring about the best possible
reasons is a way of exposing ourselves to others and
reaching out to them in the name of a community of
discourse, a way of inviting them to join us in building this
community. Refusing to provide reasons or to care about
them is a rejection of community, an attempt to get others
to accept our word as the last word. It is the will to power
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which needs argument and thus reasons.

at work.
Each of the ideas for which I earlier claimed Platonic
ancestry points to this final one. For me its essential
rightness has taken a long time to sink in. Teaching for
many years is what made it possible. Largely by
happenstance, I stumbled into a way of teaching which
involved taking positions in class - real positions, positions
to which I was seriously if provisionally committed - and
urging students to come at them with their probing
criticism. My initial motivationwas to get them thinking by
making myself vulnerable in this way. But what I
discovered was a dialectic in which, on the good days, we
pushed each other into thinking in new ways and doing this
together for the sake of · deeper understanding. I
rediscovered Plato.
How can there be academic communitywithout something
like this as the controlling ethos, in the conversations not
only of faculty with students but among students themselves
and even - the biggest challenge - within the faculty? How
( even more) can it fail to be the controlling ethos at a
college of the church, with its confession of faith in the
creative Word and trust in a Holy Spirit moving among us?
Here, at least, Athens and Jerusalem should meet.
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RESPONSES:

"The Lutheran Liberal Arts College and Care for the Earth,"
by H. Paul Santmire, in Intersections (June 1997)
Arthur A. Preisinger

I found most of H. Paul Santmire's article, "The Lutheran
Liberal Arts College and Care for the Earth," commendable
and thought-provoking. The critique of the "back-to-nature"
cult, the call for a holistic environmental ethos in the face of
crass materialism and "sociopathic individualism," the
suggestion ofcreating a cosmic liturgical praxis - all provide
considerable food for thought and, indeed, action.
Nevertheless, I take issue with Santmire on several counts
relative to the section on classical Lutheran social ethics.
Santmire admits that much of White's argument "is
historically justified, insofar as one can allow that religious
faith can exercise in.fact a signtficant historical causality.
He goes on at some length to defend the ecological tradition
in Western theology - as if Lutheran theology were
something wholly apart from Western theology! Santmire
encourages contemplation of the riches in the vaults of
Western theology, advising us not to ''conclude that all
historic Christianity has to offer is anthropocentrism and the
domination ofnature." He encourages such contemplation of
the riches ofLutheran vaults, too. But what are these riches?
Only one, as far as I can see: "At its best, the Lutheran
tradition has sent forth forgiven sinners to be good citizens
and witnesses to· the kingdom of God that has arrived in
Jesus Christ." That is all the Lutheran tradition has to offer?
He has damned it with faint praise. Why the bum rap for
Lutherans?
What is wrong here, in my op1mon, is a simplistic
delineation of the two kingdoms ethic. Granted, the two
kingdoms doctrine has been used by German theologians of
this century to justify acquiescence to the Nazi regime. Did
the regime itself use the "two kingdoms" to justify its
actions? There is precious little evidence for that. If the two
kingdoms really was one of the sources ofNazi mischief, it
could only be so insofar as one can allow that religious faith
can exercise in fact a significant historical causality. As a
Arthur A. Preisinger is Associate Professor of
Theology/Philosophy and History at Texas University.

matter of fact, both A confessional and liberal German
theologians of the nineteenth century used a distorted and
misinterpreted two kingdoms doctrine to separate ethics
from the gospel.
Luther never wrote a systematic treatise on the doctrine of
the two kingdoms. (The term itself, by the way, became
common as late as the 1930's.) He used diverse terminology
to come to grips with the ethical problems of the Christian of
his day. One _needs to examine the two kinds of dualities
(antithetical and complementary) by which he explicates the
doctrine. Luther does make a distinction between what he
sometimes calls the "left hand" and the "right hand" of God.
But these are elements of the "complementary duality," i.e.,
what Ulrich Duchrow calls the two governances of God.
True, the right distinction must be made between the two
governances: they must not be confused. On the other hand,
they must not be separated. The temporal (Kingdom of
creation?) and spiritual (Kingdom of redemption?)
governances are not spheres that can be separated, but
dimensions to be distinguished. I will not go into the
complexities here. I suggest a reading of Karl Hertz, ed.,
Two Kingdoms and One World: A Source book in Christian
Ethics: Ulrich Duchrow, Two Kingdoms - The Use and
Misuse of a Lutheran Theological Concept: and Tom
Strieter's excellent Th.D. dissertation, "Contemporary Two
Kingdoms and Governances Thinking to Today's World."
If, in fact, the two kingdoms doctrine was the reason for all
those German Lutherans jumping on the Nazi bandwagon,
how does Santmire explain all those German Roman
Catholics, who had no such doctrine, jumping on the same
bandwagon?
I do not know what Santmire means by "classical Lutheran
teaching." Sixteenth century (Luther)? Seventeenth century?
What? Ifhe puts the onus of intersection "only in the person
of the individual believer. .." on Luther, I think he is dead
wrong. One should read, for example, Luther's commentary
ofPsalm 82, or, "On Temporal Authority: To What Extent
It Should Be Obeyed."
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Santmire argues that the two kingdoms is admirable for the
theology of God's grace, but it "leaves much to be desired as
an affirmation and defense of the theology of God's justice."
Again, I contend it is not the two kingdoms doctrine as such
that is to be faulted, but its abuse and misappropriation. For
a very insightful discussion of the evolution of Luther's
views on law and justice, I suggest F. Edward Cranz, An
Essay on the Development of Luther's Thought on Justice,
Law, and Society, vol. XIX of the Harvard Theological
Series, issued as an extra number of the Harvard
Theological Review ( 1964).
It is ironic that Santmire brings up South Africa. The South
African Council of Churches used the two kingdoms
(correctly interpreted) in its fight against apartheid. I had
discussed this very thing with Wolfram Kistner when he was
head of the Theological Division of the Council. And
Eberhard Bethge had lectured in South Africa on the two
kingdoms, seeing it as a theological tool in the struggle.
It is a real stretch to link the two kingdoms doctrine with the
alleged non-concern of church leaders for the "groaning of
the earth and its masses in this era of global envifonmental

crisis." I doubt if church leaders know much, or care much,
about the two kingdoms. The issue of whether or not to
"hold hands with the Episcopalians," it seems to me, has
been driven by church politics rather than by theology. If
theology were the issue, the agreement with the
Presbyterians, the Reformed Church and the UCC would not
so easily have glided through the ELCA Assembly in
August.
Fundamental issues of social justice are being obscured in
our time by many "circles" besides Lutherans. How do we
know that "toxic waste dumps .. ." do not "appear" to be a
matter of concern for "many" Lutherans today? Who are
these "many Lutheran circles"? This is simply too general
and too emotive to be taken seriously.
If we are to look for skeletons in our closet, let us search for
real bones, not plastic ones. As far as I am concerned, the
skeletons are not so much Luther as a departure from
Luther. As Bill Lazareth has written, "There is nothing so
sick about Lutheran ethics that a strong dose of Luther
cannot cure it."

A RESPONSE TO PAUL SANTMIRE
Don Braxton
When asked if Lutheran theology and ethics has anything
distinctive about it, my usual response - general but accurate
- is that Lutheran thinking is above all else governed by a
dialectical vision. Reaching back to Paul and Augustine,
Luther's thought is thoroughly dialectical. Polarities such as
Law and Gospel, Two Kingdoms, and Freedom and
Bondage, are the driving dynamic force behind Luther's
powerful Refonnation theology. Paul Santmire's address to
Capital University delivered on November 14, 1997, clearly
embodies that tradition both in form and in content. Because
they seem so well rooted in the normative traditions of our
Lutheran liberal arts heritage, his suggestions offer the
prospect of authentic guidance for the Lutheran college
serious about its past - and its future.
Santmire's vision for the Lutheran liberal arts college in an
environmental age is clearly dialectical. Formally, Santmire
articulates three mandates, each of which is expounded in
Don Braxton is Assistant Professor in The Department of
Religion, Capital University.

terms of its strengths and weaknesses, or as Santmire puts it,
"skeletons in our closets and riches in our own vaults." This
formal mode of presentation seems to me very important, for
it articulates a basic insight of Lutheran thought on
institutional structures. Namely, those strengths which
enable an institution to thrive can often lead to the same
institutions' decay, either through complacency and even
hubris, or through blindness. While Lutheran liberal arts
colleges need to draw upon their historical strengths, yet they
also need to evolve as institutions to respond to the prospects
and dangers of a dynamic world. In effect, they need to
identify their social functions historically and serve those
same functions today, yet do so under quite different societal
conditions. In other words, they must do things differently
in order to continue to do what they have always done.
On the content level, Santmire identifies three themes. The
first theme is responsibility for spiritual particularity.
Addressing a theme Santmire is uniquely qualified to assess,
he calls for an honest owning up to the ambiguity of the
Christian tradition toward the environment. Clearly, there
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are skeletons in the closet of the Christian tradition on this
account. But there are also profound resources both
:historically and in the prolific, contemporary field of
ecotheology and ethics. Likewise I think Santmire is on
target when he warns against a premature flight to
alternative religious traditions because of a putative greater
sensitivity to the environment. I would point out that the
historical record of the actual behaviors of these traditions
is rarely critically assessed. At the very least, it must be
emphasized that theoretical environmental sensitivity in
either the Christian or the non-Christian traditions is no
guarantee of ecologically responsible behavior in practice.
The theme of ambiguity is carried over to comments on the
distinctively Lutheran tradition of Two Kingdoms. Here
again, I think Santmire is fundamentally on target. Yet
while he is quite specific about the deficits of typical
Lutheran social ethics, he is strangely mute on what the
strengths might be. At issue, I think, is whether one views
Luther's ethics as dualistic or dialectical. On the one hand,
classical Lutheran ethics has been, and often still can be,
very quietistic. On matters of social justice, Lutherans often
regard the church as unqualified to enter into worldly
political and social struggles. At the very most, it has
sought to convert the individual conscience for higher
standards of behavior in their secular offices. In this day
and age, where we recognize the power of social structures
to shape and mold character and individual behavior, such
a stance 1s clearly inadequate. But, on the other hand,
Lutheran ethics at its best is dialectical, recognizing the
interpenetration of church and world, Law and Gospel,
eschatological Kingdom and present day realities. History,
as in St. Augustine, for example, can be regarded as
salvation history, as the dynamic struggle for the birthing
forth in bits and pieces of a redeemed world. While
Lutherans will always be clear that the world is not the
Kingdom of God - the Lutheran emphasis on sin will
preclude that - yet they may also look for and cooperate with
the signs of the in-breaking of God's glorious New Age, the
New Heavens and the New Earth. Such a vision was clearly
at the root of the Lutheran Hegel, or the Lutheran theologian
Ritschl. Bonhoeffer and Reinhold Niebuhr certainly fit in
this camp, as does the contemporary Lutheran ecotheologian
Larry Rasmussen. At its best, the dialectical patterns of
Lutheran social ethics grants us a sensitivity - hopeful yet
realistic - to the relative approximations of ecological and
social justice possible in our various historical moments. It
seems to me that Santmire could have done more to point out
these qualities.
The other two mandates of responsible social criticism and

the promotion of a responsible environmental ethos can be
taken together. Clearly, the objective of the liberal arts
tradition is to promote liberal thinkers, liberal in the classical
sense of liberated from excessive parochialism. The
question only remains, to what extent are Lutheran liberal
arts colleges still doing this. Two remarks: First, my
experience of many Lutheran colleges and universities is that
their liberal arts dimensions have been progressively on the
retreat in favor of more marketable vocational training in the
areas of business, education, computer science, and the like.
It is a matter of considerable debate as to what degree our
graduates have managed to imbibe some of the liberal arts
ethos, even as they have concentrated on their vocational
choices. At least, that is often the rationale one hears for
this institutional drift. Second, a brief glance at the
promotional materials of our Lutheran colleges and
universities will raise doubts as to whether Lutheran higher
education promises to lead students deeper into the
complexities of modem, urban life, as Santmire calls for.
Indeed, I often have the impression that students and their
families select private liberal arts colleges because they
promise a safe and sheltered learning experience, not one of
exposure. Are the products of such educational experiences
prepared to enter our complex and wounded world equipped
with the critical resources of a liberally educated individual?
Finally, in my opinion, if there is an issue toward which
contemporary liberal arts education ought to gravitate, it is
environmental responsibility and responsible social criticism
of ecologically unsustainable practices. Here, I believe
Santmire places his finger on exactly the three dimensions of
institutional reform required of contemporary institutions,
namely, curricular reform, a pedagogy directed toward
creative social imagination, and the practices of reverence
and respect before life and its mysteries. Because ecology
is the science sine qua non of interrelationships, it constitutes
the best available option for a capstone integration
experience. Debates have been circulating on the inclusion
of an environmental studies component in our core
curriculum here at Capital, yet without much success to
date. As the world, its populations, civilizations, and
ecosystems become increasingly interdependent, I believe
that some form of environmental studies component in every
educational experience will be an inevitability. A step in
that direction would be in keeping with the creative, liberal
thinking of our heritage, a sign that our imaginations are
already reaching into the future, anticipating an age of
greater ecological sanity. Until that time, liberal arts
colleges can practice creative workshops known as
"liturgies" where a new reality is pronounced, attended to,
and dramatized into reality. Worship is a form of resistance
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to the compulsions of instrumentalism and the false
necessities in our age. Worship creates a space in which
human potential can be unleashed, where creative
imagination can be exercised, and where a fortitude of will
can be developed to enter the world, in Santmire' s phrase,
daring to be "irrelevant" to its insanity and thereby offering
an alternative that may promise a brighter future.
Liberal arts colleges have a tough road ahead. In the face of
all these suggestions, many administrators and professors
will be quick to point out that competition is stiff and that
institutions must strike compromises. Could an institution
like Capital really survive if it sought to embody what has
been outlined in Santmire's article and my response?

realism, I am willing· to go some distance in this
conversation. And yet, realism cuts two ways. Is it realistic
to believe that we can continue to function in a busines-as
usual mode in the face oflooming ecocrisis? Is it realistic to
believe that liberal arts colleges can shove their liberal arts
orientations to the periphery and still be liberal arts colleges
with something distinctive to offer the educational world? Is
it realistic to believe that we can equip students for
responsible citizenship by training them to be articulate
members of a global economy whose vision of a good
society is an acre ofsuburban bliss, plenty ofhorsepower in
the driveway, and recreational trips to Martha's Vineyard,
Mt. Rushmore, or Club Med? So will the real realism please
stand up? Where do you stand?

Indeed, in my own dialectical view, with its bent toward
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Buford, Thomas 0.
In Search of a Calling: The College's Role in Shaping Identity.
Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995
Karla G. Bohmbach

The term "calling" has long been a favorite among Lutheran
educators. And though its precise meaning invites debate - indeed, perhaps partly because of that very fact - - it
continues to be utilized even today in efforts to formulate
and refine what it means to be a Lutheran college or
university. In such ongoing efforts Thomas 0. Buford's In
Search of a CaUing: The College's Role in Shaping Identity
would seem to be a promising participant, not least because
it makes use of the term "calling" in its title. What, more
precisely, does this book offer towards our thinking about
tasks, challenges, and promises facing Lutheran colleges and
universities as they move into the twenty-first century?
Like others who have also been writing about higher
education (e.g., Mark Schwehn, Page Smith, Bruce
Wilshire), the author asserts that colleges and universities
are in trouble. What sets Buford's work apart, though, is
both his perspective as a philosopher and his assessment that
the fundamental cause ofthis trouble is a crisis of meaning
among students.
Karla G. Bohmbach is Assistant Professor of Religion at
Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, Pa.

One ofthe first tasks Buford sets for himselfis determining
the causes of this meaning-crisis; his strategy is to examine
discussion. In the process, Buford also more specifically
identifies and explicates what he sees as two aspects of
the historical background in, through and against which
American higher education has developed. Here the concept
of"calling" is central, giving shape and focus to thecalling.
One involves the spiritual, religious, or moral identity of a
person (all three terms are variously used). It refers,
fundamentally, to that which God has ordained one to do; its
roots are in the Hebrew Bible; and it is strongly
communitarian. The second has to do with the so-called
practical identity of a person. This aspect is much more
individualistic; its roots are in the Renaissance; and it
centers on the humanists' assertion that individuals have the
right and ability to determine their own lives, to discern their
particular gifts, talents, and interests and then choose a life
and career based on them.
For Buford, both aspects of calling are necessary in order to
achieve full personhood. The crisis facing students is that
these two are deemed irreconcilable and so have been largely
split asunder by the educational system. Moreover, the
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practical aspect - - under the influence of our technological
society - - has been given priority, with the concomitant
neglect of the moral or theological one. Buford seeks both to
reconnect and balance the two sides.
In order to do so, Buford revisits the two historical traditions
- - the biblical and the Renaissance humanist - - that,
according to him, have fundamentally shaped the
moral/theological and practical aspects of calling. His goal
is to find some common ground by which he can reconcile
the two traditions - - and the two aspects - - into some sort
of coherent whole. Thus, in looking again at the Renaissance
humanist tradition, he "corrects" for its rampant
individualism, stressing the social and cultural contexts
within which an individual's choices and decisions are made
and shaped. (His position here is actually akin to a type of
postmoderism called affirmative (Rosenau), as well as
feminist theoretical work focused on the concept of
positionality (Alcoffi ). In other words, while retaining a
degree of individualism in the Renaissance humanist
tradition, Buford balances it by also arguing for its
somewhat contingent nature.
In Buford's re-examination of the biblical tradition, he
rethinks the meaning of imago dei, the idea that we are
created in the image of God. Traditionally, according to
Buford, "image of God" has meant "copy of God," with that
which is copied being, most notably, God's rationality. For
humans to be copies, though, implies considerable
limitations, for it is then God, understood as the original,
who determines human identities. Buford suggests instead
that the imago de1 in humans be understood not as a copy,
but rather as a representation. He further suggests that what
is most fundamentally represented about God in humanity is
not rationality, but rather imagination. Since imagination
implies a certain amount of freedom, human individuality
and a certain degree of independence is maintained. Thus,
while retaining the biblical assertion that human identity is
grounded in God, a certain space - - the space of the
imagination - - is opened up for human initiative and free
play.
In Buford's reconstructions the humanist and biblical
traditions come together insofar as they both allow for
human freedom, while also both placing limits on that same
freedom. One's calling, then, is to be worked out within the
horizon of this tension between freedom and limitation.
According to Buford, the task of colleges is to encourage the
students' creative use of their imaginations, helping them to
exercise a "new" freedom that they have in college to

develop their own life stories (i.e., their "callings"), over
against the stories about themselves which they have
inherited from their parents, hometowns, friends, schools,
and/or churches. Equally, however, it is the duty of colleges
to support, indeed, make known, the limitations that exist for
students as they begin to take advantage of the possibilities
in imaginatively re-writing their stories (i.e., "finding their
callings").
Buford's book is extremely beneficial in tracing out the
broad historical contexts that inform the ideals and interests
of the present-day system of American higher education.
And he teases out well the complicated intertwining
relationships of the biblical and Renaissance humanist
traditions - - particularly their somewhat distinct
perspectives on calling. His breadth is also impressive, for
though his professional training is in philosophy, he also
makes forays into such diverse fields as biblical studies (in
an exegesis of Genesis 1-2), Christian theology (while
considering Augustine's view of personhood), educational
psychology (in a review of William Perry's theory of the
developmental stages of students), and business management
(in order to summarize and critique the reengineering system
proposed by Michael Hammer and James Campy). What is
both puzzling and problematic, however, is his final chapter,
in which his practical recommendations to colleges are
presented.
Although he has earlier affirmed the need to work for a
balance between freedom and limitation, his focus here is
much more on the idea of maintaining limitations than
enhancing freedoms. And, regarding the maintenance of
limitations, he identifies two main interrelated obstacles that
need to be countered: the canon and multiculturalism. His
discussion of the canon is rather puzzling. On the one hand,
he pleads for an open canon, because going back to the fixed
canon of earlier generations is neither feasible nor desirable
(p. 185). On the other hand, he is extremely wary of special
interest groups (i.e., multiculturalists, supporters of women's
rights), which he views as desiring to take over the canon in
order to impose their own political agenda onto everyone
else. The solution he offers, instead, is to refer back, and
utilize again, the biblical and Renaissance humanist
traditions, after both have been appropriately reconstructed
to suit present-day needs and circumstances. (Buford is not
forthcoming on the specifics of what this reconstruction
might look like.) His justification for the reappropriation of
these two traditions is that they would make the most sense
to our students, given their backgrounds.
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centers on the limited nature of a college's resources. "To
expect an American college to teach every culture and
language that students demand, as if those students will live
out their calling in those cultures, is beyond the capability of
the college... " (p.190). I am not gainsaying the challenge
facing colleges in educating our students in a way that
informs them and fosters in them an appreciation of the
multiple cultures of the world in which they live. It is a task
that requires all the imagination and effort we can possible
marshal. It is, nevertheless, necessary. Our world is
becoming ever smaller; the interconnections across political
and social boundaries are becoming increasingly numerous
and marked. Despite Buford's disclaimer, it is, in fact, highly
likely that a significant number of our students will live out
their callings in a culture far different from the one in which
they were raised!

The problems here are several-fold. First, Buford caricatures
so-called special-interest groups. Far from wishing to "take
over," most such groups see themselves, instead, as working
to redress an identified imbalance in the canon, wherein its
interests, concerns, and viewpoints are weighted towards a
relatively narrow band of persons (i.e., white, male,
educated, middle-to upper-class, heterosexual). Second, even
though he admits that the ideals of the Bible and the
Renaissance are no better or worse than those of any other
traditions, his appeal to them as the best option (even if they
are reconstructed), leads one to suspect - - whatever his
disclaimers - - that he desires a return to an earlier,
narrowly-defined, and fixed canon.
The most serious problem, though, seems to be his argument
that these two traditions are to be preferred because they
would be the most familiar, and thus the easiest, for
students. Regarding their familiarity, Buford· consistently
operates with the notion that every student on campus is
equally invested in and/or sympathetic to - - not to say
knowledgeable of - - the ideals of the Bible and the
Renaissance. He simply assumes the existence of a
homogeneous student body, one in which all students have
the same backgrounds and share equally in the same
historical/cultural contexts. But that has never been quite the
reality in American colleges, whatever the "myth" has been,
and is even less so today.

We, as educators, need to think harder, and even more
imaginatively than Buford advocates, in order to see our way
to an education for our students that will satisfy the demands
of the 215' century.
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------Bulletin Board-----ANNOUNCING�
The Fourth Annual

Vocation of a Lutheran College Conference

Wittenberg University, Springfield, Ohio
August 6 - 9, 1998
Please contact your appropriate Dean or Provost if interested in attending.
FACULTY/ STAFF/ STUDENTS/ ALUMNI
Capital University Summer Travel Seminar to Halle-Wittenberg

Reformation and the Enlightenment

Trip includes visits to important reformation sites, lectures at Martin Luther University at Halle-Wittenberg, and day
trips to Dresden, Weimar, Berlin, Eisenach, and Leipzig, among others. Residence in dormitories and in the homes
of German families. All lectures and discussions in English. Dates: May 30 - June 14, 1998. Comprehensive fee
includes airfare, and all meals and lodging in Germany: $2500. Reservation Deadline: March 15, 1998. Contact: Dr.
Don Braxton, Dep't. Of Religion, Capital University, Columbus, OH 43209 (614) 236-6453.
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